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SOME PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS
IN GIFTS TO MINORS
DWIGHT ROGERSt
TO THE
READER.
IT is a frequent Saying in our Law-
Books, De munmis Non C14 n t lex,
which is true if it be underfaood of
.etty Things and minute Circumifances,
-Cut if we apply it to Perions, it is not
fo for it i$ moff certain, that.our Law
hath a very great and tender Confide-
ration for Perfons naturally difabled,
and efpecially for Minors. The Law
protets their Perfons, prefreves tbeir
Rights and Eflates, excufeth their Laches,
and aflifis them in their Pleadings. And
as it is ingenuoufly obferved in Holford
and Platt's Care,'2 Roll. Rep. r8. The
Judge, are their Connfcllors, the Jury are
hel& eroants, (for they ought to find
the Title at large in an Affize) vid the
Law i their Guard;an. And let meadd,
They are under the fpecial Aid and Pro-
tedion of his Equity, who is no lefs
than Keeper of the King's Confcience.
A2 i
"The Infant's Lawyer"'
London, 1712
Member of the New York Bar. Acknowledgement to so many who by comment or
advice have assisted in the preparation of this brief paper may seem pompous. George
Blattmachr, Logan Fulrath, Harold C. Jesse, John A. Lyon, Marvin Lyons, Donald Mc-
Manus, Francis X. Rohn, Joyce Stanley, and Joseph Trachtman of the New York Bar,
Eugene F. Endicott, Robert B. Gowing and Mayo Adams Shattuck of the Boston Bar,
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Introduction
In 1712, when St. John Baker's treatise (never before attempted, he
says) was published, infants acquired property largely through inher-
itance. They still do, but inter-vivos transfers by gift are increasingly
important and the concerns of the courts have perforce entered new
fields. Taxpayers have had many difficulties with gifts. Their gifts to
minors have been no exception. Because of the legal incapacity of the
donee to manage the donated property, they have been perhaps rather
more troublesome than others. Some donors have failed in one way or
another to make their gifts complete and have consequently found them-
selves liable for possibly unexpected estate,2 income3 or gift 4 taxes.
Others, time and again, have made gifts in trust for the benefit of minors,
and then strenuously and for the most part unsuccessfully have litigated
their right to use the annual exclusion or some part of it in determining
their "net" gifts for the year, while still others have boldly asserted
Clifford Bragdon, C. Herbert Rauch, G. Dykeman Sterling and Mrs. Robert Turner have
all been of major assistance, but none should be held responsible for any views expressed,
any errors or omissions. The similarity in arrangement between this paper and Mr. Austin
Fleming's article in the February, 1951 Michigan Law Review is startling, but as the
author of "The Infant's Lawyer" (see note 1 infra) remarks of his own treatise, " ... indeed
it is the Nature of the Subject, which ought to direct the Method." Mr. Fleming's pains-
taking work has been extremely helpful. The paper by Mr. Shattuck, "Gifts to Minors,"
delivered to the Real Property, Probate and Trust Section of the American Bar Association
in New York on September 17, 1951 became available too late for complete cross reference
here. Mr. Shattuck's paper will have been published in full in the October, 1951 issue of
the Boston University Law Review, slightly condensed at 90 Trusts and Estates 659,
October, 1951, and in other printings of the Proceedings of that Section before this appears.
It may be accurate to say that Mr. Shattuck's remarks are directed to larger affairs of
more prosperous clients than those mainly considered here.
1. THE IN7ANT's LAWYER. The Second Edition, In the Savoy: Printed by J. Nutt,
Assignee of Edw. Sawyer, Esq., for St. John Baker, at Thavies-Inn-Gate in Holborn, 1712.
When on p. 77 the same author writes, "in the Lord Anglesey and the Lord Ossery's Case,
27 Car. 2, B.R. Hale, Chief Justice; and the Court agreed, that this Statute extends to
Ireland, and that the Guardian appointed by the Will may have Ravishment of Ward, as
the Guardian by Knights Service or Guardian in Socage at Common Law," the protective
function he ascribes to the courts suffers some shrinkage. At least the infant's property
seems to have been carefully protected against ravishment and the courts today retain most
of their jurisdiction over infants and their property.
2. E.g., MacManus Estate et al. v. Commissioner, 172 F. 2d 697 (6th Cir. 1949).
3. E.g., Chas. F. Roeser, 2 T.C. 298 (1943); Edw. H. Heller, 41 B.T.A. 1020 (1940);
Adolph Weil, 31 B.T.A. 899 (1934), aff'd, 82 F. 2d 561 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 299 U. S.
552 (1936).
4. E.g, Estate of Sanford v. Commissioner, 308 U.S. 39 (1939); Richardson v. Com-
missioner, 126 F. 2d 562 (2d Cir. 1942); Frederic E. Camp, 15 T.C. 412 (1950).
5. Fondren et al. v. Commissioner, 324 U.S. 18 (1945), and Commissioner v. Disston,
325 U. S. 422 (1945), are good examples. A mere listing of cases involving distinctions
between present and future interests would require a half page or more of footnotes.
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that property which they continued to manage and to use indistinguish-
ably from their own had been "given" to others.0
The difficulties with which this paper is concerned relate to the inherent
need of providing some sort of management for most gifts to a minor
and the concurrent wish to secure the benefit of the annual exclusion
from the gift tax without also incurring the complication, expense and
ritual of a legal guardianship.
Theses
Many potential donors seem preoccupied with the annual exclusion,
and unduly reluctant to make gifts which will require filing returns.7
Accumulation trusts, even though no exclusion is available, are recom-
mended. Suggestions are also made as to methods by which property
such as shares of stock can be kept in manageable form without the inter-
vention of a legal guardian, with possible retention of the benefit of the
annual exclusion.' The potential usefulness of common trust funds and
investment company shares is emphasized.9
Certain Assumptions
It is assumed throughout this paper, as it was recently by Judge Raum
of the Tax Court, that an outright gift to a minor through his guardian
is a gift of a present interest ° It is also assumed that an outright gift
of property or income to the minor himself is a gift of a present interest
6. Ludwig Bendix, 14 T.C. 681 (1950).
7. Mr. Shattuck suggests a donor might "better de-emphasize the gift tax exclusion
in his thinking." Shattuck, Gifts to Minors, PROCFEDInGS Or THE SEMcIoT OP RL PnlOPErr,
PROBATE A D TRUST LAw, Ams. BAR Ass'N 11, 16 (1951), reprinted, g0 TRuSTS AND EsTATEs
659, 665 (1951).
8. The methods noted are not all court tested, but seem to meet the tests of logic
within the statute, regulations and decisions. Mr. Shattuck, supra note 7, warns against
complications that may follow the use of informal methods. In a letter to the writer Mr.
Fleming, (see note 11 infra), said: "For donors who are willing to hazard the final outcome
of litigation, the steps which you outline in your paper for accomplishing gifts to minors
seem well considered and worth a try. But for less venturesome tax-minded donors, I am
afraid I cannot conscientiously suggest the use of a gift program to minors except in the
case of those within 'shooting distance' of majority."
9. The writer's enthusiasm for investment company shares arises from long experience
as an associate of a firm which sponsors and manages two investment companies. These
companies are also popularly known as investment trusts and mutual funds.
10. The court said in a footnote: "We reject as untenable the suggestion advanced,
but not developed, by respondent, that if there were no trusts, the fact of minority and
consequent legal disability of the donees resulted in the postponement of enjoyment which
characterizes future interests. If that view were carried to its logical conclusion all gifts
to minors would be subject to this same contention. Yet it is clear that a minor, through
his guardian, may obtain immediate enjoyment of an outright gift." John E. Daniels, P-H
1951 TC MEm. DEC. 51,044 (1951).
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if the circumstances would make it a present interest were the donee a
competent adult.:1
This may still be too bold an assumption, but the Seventh Circuit
has recently gone even further to grant the exclusion in a case that
turned on the right of a six months old infant beneficiary or his non-
existent guardian to terminate a trust by a demand in writing. 2
11. But see Fleming, Gifts for the Benefit of Minors, 79 Micit. L. REv. 529 (1951),
where the author discusses, and suggests that, the leading cases, Fondren et at. v. Commis-
sioner, 324 U.S. 18 (1945), and Commissioner v. Disston, 325 U.S. 442 (1945), practically
close the door on any present interest in a gift to a minor which. is not to be promptly
spent or consumed by the donee. The writer questions that interpretation of those cases
and discusses the-matter with Mr. Fleming in 7 TAx L. Rav. 84 (1951). See also ;Jote, Gifts
to Minors, 37 A.B.A.J. 78 (1951), and Anderson, Gifts to Children and Incompetents, 26
TAxEs 911 (1948). It should be noted that a gift may be "outright" from the viewpoint
of property law, but so hedged or restricted as still to be partly or wholly a future
interest from the viewpoint of the gift tax. Spyros P. Skouras, 188 F. 2d 831 (2d Cir.
1951) (a gift requiring joint action of beneficiaries) ; Rosa A. Howze, 2 T.C. 1254 (1943)
(a gift of a remainder following a life estate); Roberts v. Commissioner, 153 F, 2d 657
(5th Cir. 1944), aff'g, 2 T.C. 679, cert. denied, 324 U.S. 841 (1945) (a gift of deferred
annuities without cash surrender value); typify this situation. See Rogers, Fleming, 7
TAx L. Rav. 84 (Nov. 1951).
12. Kieckhefer v. Commissioner, 189 F. 2d 118 (7th Cir. 1951) (italics supplied).
Dicussing the opposing theory the court said, "But because the beneficiary is a minor,
with the disabilities incident thereto, it is reasoned that the gift is of a future interest
because the disabled beneficiary is not capable of making demand. . . . Suppose the
instant taxpayer instead of creating a trust had deposited in a bank $3,000.00 in a savings
account (or even in a checking account) in the name of his grandson or had purchased
government bonds in his name. Obviously, the grandson could not have made demand upon
the bank ... or on the government ... and he could not have obtained the use, possession
or enjoyment of either. What he would have acquired would have been the right to
the use, possession or enjoyment . . . through the means provided in all jurisdictions,
so far as we are aware, that is, through a legally appointed guardian. However, we
think under either supposition that the minor would have been the beneficiary of a
gift of present rather than future interest. Certainly that would have been true If the
beneficiary of the gift in either case had been an adult, and applying the Commissioner's
concession that the same principle is to be applied in each case, it would seem to follow
that it would be equally so where the beneficiary was a minor. At any rate, no court,
so far as we are aware, has held to the contrary and we are not disposed to be the first."
Id. at 11. In Arthur C. Stifel, Jr., 17 T.C. No. 71 (Oct. 10, 1951), the Tax Court, with three
Judges dissenting, has expressly refused to follow the Kieckhefer case elsewhere, although
presumably bound by it within the confines of the Seventh Circuit. See note 172 infra.
The Senate Finance Committee Report on the Revenue Act of 1951, discussing family
partnerships, made some observations which seem pertinent to the subject of this paper:
"Two principles governing attribution of income have long been accepted as basic: (1)
income from property is attributable to the owner of the property; (2) income from
personal services is attributable to the person rendering the services. . . . If an individual
makes a bona fide gift of real estate, or of a share of corporate stocks, the rent or dividend
income is taxable to the donee. . . . Transactions between persons in a close family
group, whether or not involving partnership interests, afford much opportunity for deception
[Vol. 20
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The Practical Setting
Many parents, grandparents, uncles, aunts, other relatives and friends
at one time or another wish to give an infant money or property which
he may use, or if he is too young to use it himself, may be freely used
for him by his parents. Often the donors hope to provide educational
advantages which might otherwise be difficult or impossible of attainment.
Gifts to minors are also frequently stimulated by tax saving motives.
What lawyer or trust officer has not at some time been perplexed when
asked about convenient and practical methods of making-and managing
-- such gifts? Questions arise as to the best kind of property to give.
Should it be given outright or in trust? Should the outright gift be to a
guardian? If so, what about surety bonds, annual accountings, "legal"
investments? If a trust is considered, present interests, future interests,
exclusions, lifetime exemptions, possible loss of dependency credits, as
well as prospective administrative problems, quickly come to mind. In
addition to gift taxes in certain states, three separate and only loosely
integrated Federal tax structures are involved, so that tax consequences
may flow from the gift even in the absence of tax saving motives.
With so many intersecting and interacting rules, injunctions and
restrictions, an exploration of the possibilities soon takes on some of the
aspects of Mr. Lloyd Kennedy's n-dimensional chess game, in which the
rules have to be made up as the game progresses. 2
The requirements of a completed gift have been frequently stated.1 4
and should be subject to dose scrutiny. All the facts and circumstances at the time of
purported gift and during the periods preceding and following it may be taken into con-
sideration in determining the bona fides or lack of bona fides of a purported gift or sale."
CCH 1951 FED. TAx REP. No. 41, 38-40 (Sept. 26, 1951). These remarks .,iU doubtless
fail to reassure those practitioners who have a deep distrust of irrevocable gifts; they
certainly contain no balm for the donor who is unwilling to sever the strings that denote
substantial ownership; and of course they do not solve the problem of Visintainer,
(See Visitainer v. Commissioner, 187 F. 2d 519 (10th Cir. 1951) 500 sheep given to
each of four children), as to what part of an income is attributable to personal services,
and what part to ownership of property. Certiorari has been applied for in the Visinfliner
case.
13. See KENNEDY, FEDERAL IxcOmsE TA.ATION Or TRusrs AND ESTATES 86 n. (1948).
14. Adolph Well, 31 B.T.A. 899, 906 (1934). But see, dissent as to means of effecting
delivery of a gift of stock to a minor. Id. at 908. See also Moi.Tco ny, What Is a
Transfer by Gift?, in FEDEmuL. TArs-EsrATrs, TRust AND GUTs 940 (1951). 2 PAu,
FananA, EsTATEs AND G=sr TA.ATioN 1059 et seq. (1942); and id. c. 16 (Supp. 1946);
Haggerty, How to Make a Gift to a Minor Effective, in NEw YoRa UNIVE SiTy Eron=
AN-uAL I'zsnTuTE ON FEDELL TXATION 347 (1950). Tax law requirements for a
completed gift can differ materially from ordinary property law requirements. See inter alia
Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U. S. 331 (1940); Helvering v. Stuart, 317 U. S. 154 (1942).
Income tax, estate tax and gift tax rules are not necessarily harmonious. See JoiuN STUDY
oF ESTATES AND Gis's TAxATioN (Gov't Printing Office 1947). Requirements for a completed
1951]
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Gifts to minors benefit from at least two general rules-that there is a
presumption of acceptance by the minor and of validity of the gift,1
and that possession of a natural guardian is deemed possession of the
infant.",
The gift tax 7 provides that in addition to a lifetime exemption of
$30,00011 granted to citizens or residents of the United States, each
donor may give each year to each of as many donees as he may select,
property to the value of $3,000,1" not only excluded from and thus free
of gift tax, but also without the necessity of filing a gift tax return,"0
except that to the extent the gift is one of a future interest in property, 2n
no matter how small, there is no exclusion and a return must be filed.2
Unlimited gifts to charity may be made free of gift tax.' Moreover,
since the "family income splitting" and "community property" amend-
ments of 1948,24 a donor whose spouse in a proper case "consents"'
may effectively double his gifts both within the exclusions and within
the exemption,2" although if his gift exceeds $3,000 he will have to file a
return,2 7 arid if the gift includes any future interest in property the con-
gift may differ widely from one state to another, see e.g., LA. CIV. CODE C. 5 (1947)
(Donations Inter-Vivos).
15. See Haggerty, supra note 14.
16. Ibid.
17. INT. REV. CODE § 1000 et seq.
18. Id. § 1004 (a) (1); U.S. Treas. Reg. 108, § 86.12 (1943).
19. Id. § 1003 (b) (3); U. S. Treas. Reg. 108, § 86.10 (1943).
Throughout this paper $3000 ($6000 if married) is used as if that amount might be
normally available to the donor for gifts of securities, cash or other similar property.
Counsel should bear in mind however that Christmas gifts, wedding presents and "numerous
small gifts" as well as "occasional gifts of relatively small amounts" are specifically
mentioned, (Committee Reports, Revenue Act of 1932) as reasons for granting any exclusion
from the gift tax. Clients should be warned that the value of such gifts should be given
consideration in deciding whether or not total gifts for the year must be reported. The
practice of increasing the size of borderline gifts so that they will exceed $3000 at least
by a few dollars and thus require filing a return has much to recommend it.
20. Id. § 1006 (a) ; U.S. Treas. Reg. 108, § 86.20 (1943).
21. Id. § 1003 (b) (3) ; U.S. Treas. Reg. 108, § 86.11 (1943). Proposed legislation
(HR 4775) would grant an additional single $3000 annual exclusion for "future interests
in property." See Drexler, The Exclusion Provision of the Gift Tax Law Needs Amending,
29 TAxEs 743 (1951).
22. U. S. Treas. Reg. 108, § 86.20 (1943). Section 86.21 requires the filing of an
information return by the donee, beneficiary or trustee whenever the donor is required to
file (except in the case of charitable gifts).
23. INT. REV. CODE § 1004 (b) ; U.S. Treas. Reg. 108, §'86.13 (1943).
24. Revenue Act of 1948.
25. U. S. Treas. Reg. 108, §86.3a (1943); T.D. 5698 ff 4, 1949-1 Cum. BULL. 228.
26. INT. REv. CODE § 1000 (f).
27. U. S. Treas. Reg. 108, § 86.20 (1943) ; T.D. 5698 ff 9, 1949-1 CuMs. BULL. 239.
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senting spouse also must file.2 Gifts of community property to third
persons are generally attributable one-half to each spouse.
Proposals have been made to limit the annual exclusions to $3,000 per
donor rather than per donee, but as long as some lifetime exemption
remains in the law and as long as there are any annual exclusions from
gift tax, it is believed that the discussion which follows will continue
pertinent and-if tax saving is concerned-may possibly be even more
significant.
In considering methods of making and managing gifts, it may be
helpful to assume as a point of reference a simple set of facts. To avoid,
whenever mentioning gifts in trust, frequent references to and warnings
about the problems typified by Helvering v. Clifford' and Helvering v.
Stuart,20 the prospective donor is assumed to be a grandfather, Elder
Jones, married, who is considering making gifts to Tertius, his "grandchild
of tender years."'I He wishes to give the boy funds which may be used
-for his support, maintenance and comfort, and which if not used up in the
interim, can help with his higher education. Elder's previous gifts, if any,
to his adult son, Jones II, the father of Tertius, or to others, have all
been outright and all within the annual exclusions, so that both his
$30,000 lifetime exemption and that of his wife are still intact. He
knows about the exclusion and thinks he can spare from $3,000 to $6,000
now and perhaps be able to make additional gifts in the future.
The gift may be made outright or in trust. A trust might provide
that income would be paid out to or for his grandson annually or more
often. It may provide for accumulation, a combination of accumulation
and pay-out, or it could give to the trustee discretion in the matter. The
gift tax consequences of these various provisions differ. They will be
considered later, as will some of the kinds of property that might be given.
A mere list of possible media will suggest to the experienced some reasons
why gifts should be made in trust, for as soon as an outright gift is made
the management of the infant's property may require either a ritualistic
conformity with rules of guardianship or an equally troublesome attempt
to avoid them.
PART I-OUTRIGHT GIFTS
Guardianship
Protection of infant's property is no new concern of the state. For
centuries courts of equity have claimed and exercised, independently of
28. Ibid.
29. 309 U.S. 331 (1940). Cf. U.S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.22 (a) (1943); T.D. 5567,
1947-2 Cum. BuLL. 9. See note 134 infra.
30. 317 U. S. 154 (1942), as modified by L,". REV. CODE § 167 (c). See note 135 infra.
31. See Fondren et at. v. Commissioner, 324 U. S. 18, 19 (1945).
1951]
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statute, inherent jurisdiction over the custody, care and control of
infants whether or not property rights are involved. 2 As a broad generali-
zation only a guardian 8 legally appointed, bonded and qualified can
safely act in connection with most properties of a minor. One not so
armed who undertakes to deal directly with the property of an infant may
be treated as a trespasser8 4 In effect he becomes an insurer not only of
the value of the property but of the disposition of the proceeds of its
sale8
This is the terrifying spectre that confronts banks, brokers, transfer
agents or any other solvent persons dealing with funds or property of
minors. So strict is the rule that even in ordinary commercial transac-
tions a third party purchaser for value in good faith and without notice
may be called on to pay a second time for property belonging to an
infant. 6 Thus it is a bold financial institution which will throw onto the
shoulders of its own stockholders the risk of any sort of transaction in
the funds or property of a minor unless the ritual of guardianship is fully
carried out.
Technically, then, it would appear that almost any property owned
outright by a minor should be held and managed by a legal guardian
under strict court supervision. Generally speaking, other methods are
extra-legal and so involve some financial risk both to the one who holds
or manages the property and also perhaps to innocent third parties who
deal with him. 7 Despite the supervision by the courts there seems to
be no censure-as contrasted with financial risk-for a failure to use
legal guardianship routines where inter-vivos transfers are reviewed. S
32. In New York legislative concern as well as judicial is both extensive and particular.
It is against N.Y. PENAL LAW § 483c to tattoo an infant under sixteen, while N.Y. Cox-
SERVATION LAW § 217 permits him to sell certain bait fish without a license. See generally
43 C.J.S. 51 (1945).
33. N.Y. SURROGATE'S COURT ACT Art. 10; N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW Art. 6. The Roman
terms tutor and curator are also still in current use in the United States. BAXER, TUE
INFANT'S LAWYER (London, 1712), names "four manner of guardians." ELSWOnTII, A
HANDY BooK ON TE LAW OF INFANTS (London, 1861), identifies nine varieties. 2 HEATON,
SURROGATES § 208 (6th ed. 1950) discusses seven varieties. See also Cannon v. Robertson,
98 F. Supp. 331 (D.N.C. 1951).
34. Sherman v. Ballou, 8 Cow. 304 (N.Y. 1828).
35. Casey v. Kastel, 237 N.Y. 305, 142 N.E. 671 (1924).
36. Matter of Goodchild, 160 Misc. 738, 290 N.Y. Supp. 683 (Surr. Ct. 1936).
37. Ibid.
38. Matter of Brady, 228 App. Div. 56, 239 N.Y. Supp. 5 (3d Dep't 1930), where the
court said, "convenience or necessities of accounting as general guardian would justify
his action" in placing stock in children's accounts rather than in having it issued "to
himself in his capacity of general guardian." Id. at 61, 239 N.Y. Supp. at 10. See also
generally c. 2, The Legal Framework, in FEDERAL SECURITY AGENCY, GUARDIANSHIP, CIlIL-
DREN'S BUREAU PUBLICATION No. 330 (1949).
[Vol. 20
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A legal guardianship, however, is often cumbersome. Annual accounts
must be filed. Every expenditure of principal or income must be autho-
rized or approved. If investments with high yields have to be sold to
conform the list to legal standards, a sharp reduction in income may
follow3 It is expensive in out-of-pocket costs, too.
In a recently closed New York guardianship involving $30,000
principal, the costs over its three year period are believed to have been
about as follows:
Income-3 years @ 3% (estimated) $2,700
Expenses
Original Proceeding
Legal Fees40  $750
Costs and Expenses 70 $820
Bond-3 years @ $135 405
Legal Fees on Accountings 200
Guardian's Commissions
(actually waived) 970
Total 2,395
Balance for Infant (1/3 of 1% per year) $305
The infant would have received about $1,425 or 48% of the estimated
3% income because guardian's commissions, payable to a parent, were
waived.
If Elder Jones gives $3,000 to his grandson, and a guardian is
appointed, the account might run something like this:
39. See the Section "Investments of Guardians and Conservators" in Schuyler,
Probate Courts: Law and Procedure, PROCEEDInGS OF TWE SEcTnoi OF REAL Pnorrr,
PROBATE, AND TRUST LAW, Am. BAR Ass's" 29, 31 (1951), reprinted, 90 Tnusrs A.ND
ESTATES 695, 697 (1951), for a review of state laws. Possibly these observations greatly
overstate the nuisance and cost of small guardianships. Mr. Thurston Greene of the
Connecticut and New York Bars mentions Mir. Shattuck's summary of the difficulties
of guardianships (see Shattuck, supra note 7, at 12) and says in part "with the possible
exception of one of these four reasons it seems to me that there must be many communities
where his objections do not hold water. Up here in the hills where I practice, for example,
a guardianship can be set up in an hour's time with virtually no expense, under the
benign investment guidance of the full Prudent Man rule and with the only "bond"
consisting of the name of the wife on a piece of paper in which the guardian says he will
be a good guardian .... The stakes in this arrangement are not high, but it seems to me
that it can be extraordinarily useful and might be used frequently .... "
40. This fee is believed to be substantially higher than would usually be sanctioned by
the Surrogate's Court in New York County in an uncomplicated guardianship.
1951]
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Income @ est. 3% $ 90
or @ est. 6% 180
Expenses
Surety bond for $3,000 each year"1  $20
Legal fees in original proceeding42  50
Guardian's commissions (waived)
Annual accountings-end of first year and
every year thereafter43  25
Total expenses 1st year (est.) $95
Annual expenses thereafter (est.) $45
Commissions to the guardian could be waived by the particular appointee,
who might be the father or mother of the infant, but the cost seems
excessive to Jones when he glances at the figures. He thinks of it as a
serious obstacle to his objectives.
In New York, where the guardian files his annual accounts with the
Surrogates Court, he is not compelled to convert guardianship property
to "legal" investment,44 but like other fiduciaries whose powers are
derived from statute rather than from a written instrument he assumes a
personal financial risk if he fails to conform investments to the statutory
standard within a "reasonable" time.4" Inasmuch as he must frequently
furnish a bond, his surety, if a commercial bonding company, will interest
itself in the investment situation, and if there is any doubt about the ade-
quacy of the guardian's financial resources, the surety may use its position
to press for compliance with "legal" investment standards. The New York
rule now says the guardian may be 35% "prudent. '40 If Jones makes
his gift in property which is not "legal," as in stock of his own or of
41. In New York a bond may be waived if the guardianship property is (a) under
$10,000 and administered jointly with the clerk or guardian clerk of the Surrogate's
Court in certain counties, (N.Y. SuRROCATE'S COURT ACT § 190 (5) ), or (b) under $7,500
and administered jointly with the Surrogate in the rest of the State, (N. Y. SURROOAT'S COURT
ACT § 180). Section 106 provides for custody in a banking institution, a method of
dispensing with bond if the fund is larger.
42. In New York County the services of a lawyer are unnecessary in simple guardian-
ships. The guardian clerk will assist in obtaining necessary appointment and maintenance
orders.
43. See note 42 supra.
44. Cf. N.Y. PERs. PROP. LAW § 21 (6); N.Y. DEC. EsT. LAW § 111 (6), and Matter
of Horton, 166 Misc. 768, 3 N.Y.S. 2d,215 (Surr. Ct. 1938) (guardian not surcharged).
45. Matter of Horton, supra note 44. See Haggerty, Obligations of New York
Fiduciaries, 16 FORD. L. REv.,153, 182 (1947), for a detailed analysis of the cases.
46. N.Y. PaRs. PROP. LAW § 21 (M), effective July 1, 1950, permits 35% of the
assets of "fiduciaries" to be invested under limited "Prudent Man" standards in what
were formerly non-legal investments.
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another corporation, he could presumably attach to the gift the condition
that the stock should be retained until needed for proper expenditures
of the guardianship. If he is interested in the benefit of the $3,000
annual exclusion for his gift, however, he should avoid the implications
of Kathrine Schuinacher,47 in which the taxpayer was denied an exclu-
sion, on the grounds she had created a future interest in the property,
where she had instructed the "guardian" to hold the property until the
infant-donee reached twenty-one. The "natural" as distinguished from
the "legal" or "general" guardian is often mentioned by the courts in
cases involving minors' property.48 Customarily a parent has acted in
the interest of the child without court appointment and accounting.
He is said to have acted as "natural" guardian. 2
Infants' Acts and Contracts Validated by Statute
Here and there the ancient rules have been changed. Most significant
in its nation-wide consequences is the extreme liberality of the regulations
governing issue and redemption of United States Savings Bonds of all
series. These provide in substance that anyone, including the minor,
may purchase bonds in the name of a minor, and that payment will be
made "direct to such minor presenting the bond for payment if, at the
time payment is requested, he is of sufficient competency and understand-
ing to sign his name to the request and to comprehend the nature of
such act."8 0 Otherwise payment may be made to a parent or to another
with whom the minor resides8 1 Provisions for the reissue of Savings
Bonds are similarly liberal."
The legislature in New York has also granted extensive privileges to
minors and corresponding protection to those who deal with them in the
Banking Law, 3 the Insurance Law,54 the Negotiable Instruments Lawv
and the Debtor and Creditor Law. 0 It has thus opened the way to many
47. 8 T.C. 453 (1947).
48. Eg., John E. Daniels, P-H 1951 TC Mss.. DEC. ff 51,044 (1951); Charles F. Roeer,
2 T.C. 298 (1943); Emil Frank, 27 B.T.A. 1158 (1933); Harry C. Moores, 3 B.T.A.
301 (1926) ; Haynes v. Gwin, 137 Ark. 387, 209 S.W. 67 (1919).
49. See note 33 supra.
50. 31 CODE FED. REGs. § 315.39 (1949). Mr. Shattuck supra note 7, calls this "an
unsettling rule.'
51. 31 CODE FFa. REGs. § 315.40 (1949).
52. 31 CODE FED. REGs. § 315.42 (1949).
53. N. Y. BANx=G LAW § 134 (1). Cf. N.Y. BANrnG LAW H9 239 (1), 171 (1), 310
(2), and 394 (3), for other banking provisions.
54. N.Y. LNsuRANc LAW §§ 145, 146, 147.
55. N.Y. NEoTIABrx IwsTmmRu rs LAW § 41; Uiro ar NEcomrx INSnzm r
AcT § 22.
56. N.Y. DEBTOR AND CREDITOR LAW §§ 260, 261.
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business transactions while effectively barring some particularly obnoxious
forms of disaffirmance.11 Under the Insurance Law minors of 14 years,
6 months and over may contract for life insurance with some moderate
restrictions on selection of beneficiaries, but they enjoy every other
"right, privilege and benefit" as though an adult. 8 An insurance
company is protected in paying within the terms of the policy $2,000,
or up to $2,000 per year, to a minor of eighteen or over." When the
statute was called to its attention one company was willing to make a
substantial payment to a seventeen-year-old college student.
The liberality of the Banking Law on the subject is impressive.
Relating to commercial banks and trust companies, it starts out: "any
minor may endorse a check payable to his order for the purpose of
depositing the proceeds in a deposit in his name and when any deposit
shall be made by or in the name of a minor . . ."the statute continues
that the deposit shall be the minor's alone, that he can draw on it "by
check or otherwise" and that "the receipt, acquittance or order of payment
of such minor shall be a valid and sufficient release and discharge for
such deposit or any part thereof to the bank or trust company."10 Section
239 makes comparable provisions for a minor's control of his own savings
account, while other sections treat private banks, industrial banks and
savings and loan associations.
These provisions seem solidly grounded on comumon sense, but even
remedial legislation has to stop somewhere and this line of enactment
ceases abruptly at the transfer of stock. One might hazard a guess that
in dollar value savings bank deposits or Series "E" Savings Bonds, or
for that matter checking accounts in the names of minors, exceed by
many millions of dollars the total of stocks registered in their names,
but Section 2 of the Uniform Stock Transfer Act states firmly, "Nothing
in this article shall be construed as enlarging the powers of an infant...
to make a valid ... assignment or power of attorney." 1
The United States Treasury will apparently permit a minor to buy
up to $100,000 of Series "F" or "G" bonds in each calendar year and
also to redeem them, but if the same minor wishes to sell a single share
of a $10 stock, the Stock Transfer Act stands squarely in his way.
Reasons for the difference are obscure, but it might be realistic to guess
57. E.g. Sternlieb v. Normandie National Securities Corp., 263 N.Y. 245, 188 N.E.
726 (1934); Joseph v. Schatzkin, 259 N.Y. 241, 181 N.E. 464 (1932).
58. N.Y. INSURANCE LAW § 145.
59. N. Y. INsu ANcE LAW § 145 (2). $2,000 would buy a lot more groceries in 1940
when the amount was set than it does in 1951.
60. N. Y. BANKwiNG LAW § 134 (1).
61. Adopted in 48 states, Alaska, District of Columbia and Hawaii, U~noR STocK
TRANSFER AcT § 2; N.Y. PE~s. PROP. LAW § 163. Cf. N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 139.
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that the Government needed the money, and that bankers and insurance
companies are more effective with the legislatures than stock brokers.
Against this background of the legal perimeters of management of
property in the outright ownership of minors, it may be instructive to
examine briefly various forms of property which Elder Jones might use
to make his gift to Tertius.
(1) Currency
If the donor physically hands his grandson "bills in his crib"02 it would
certainly seem a 100% present interest. The donee's father or mother
could see to it that "U. S. Savings Bonds and annuities"O were bought
a savings account opened in the infant's name, 4 or the bills themselves,
until needed, safely hoarded. Presumably a guardian subsequently ap-
pointed would take them under his control and presumably the infant's
father or mother would be accountable either to the guardian or to
Tertius himself on his coming of age, not only for the principal but also,
if uninvested, for reasonable interest in the meantime.05 If his parents
turn the money over to Tertius, and while still a minor he squanders
"some part of the property he has received, or even all of it, he may,
nevertheless, disaffirm the contract and get back what he himself gave
[his receipt], giving back only what he continues to hold."c0
(2) Bank Deposit-Commercial or Savings, etc.-in Tertius' Name
The Bank can accept a deposit and can disburse it on the infant's
order. 7 As no unauthorized person intermeddles with the minor's
property it would seem a riskless procedure0 8 Such a deposit would
appear to be a gift of 100% present interest0 9
62. John W. Kieckhefer, 15 T. C. 111 (1950), rev'd, 189 F. 2d 118 (7th Cir. 1951).
63. Chas. F. Roeser, 2 T. C. 298 (1943).
64. Ibid. See also John E. Daniels, P-H 1951 TC Mnrs. DEc. U 51,044 (1951).
65. Clarkson et al. v. De Peyster, 1 Hopkins Ch. 424 (N.Y. 1825). The guardian in
this case seems to have had a most unfortunate experience. He was first surcharged for
interest (at 7%) because he had not invested the money, then when he paid it into court
to be invested by court order he was later held responsible for a decline in market value.
Id. at 504.
66. Wyatt v. Lortscher, 217 App. Div. 224, 227, 216 N.Y. Supp. 571, 574 (4th Dep't
1926), citing Green v. Green, 69 N.Y. 553 (1877).
67. See note 53 supra.
68. An officer of a medium sized bank in a college town in a state which then had
no statute corresponding to §134 of the New York Banking Law, remarked a few years
ago that his bank had handled many millions of dollars in accounts of minors without a
single attempt that he knew of to disaffirm.
69. See Kieckhefer v. Commissioner, 189 F. 2d 118, 121 (7th Cir. 1951). But see Note,
Gifts To Minors, 37 A. B. A. J. 78 (1951), which suggests it might be a future interest
if the minor were too young to draw it out. See note 11 supra.
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(3) U. S. Savings Bonds, Series "E," "F," "G"
The purchase of Savings Bonds by registry in the name of a minor
would also seem to be wholly a gift of a present interest. 70 As explained
earlier, the minor or his parent or his "natural" guardian can redeem them
with a minimum of red tape at any time an adult could do so. Naming
a co-owner of the bond, since either of the owners -can cash it,7' creates
an element of uncertainty as to the ultimate recipient of the gift which
should be avoided.72 Naming a beneficiary to whom the bond is payable
on the death of the owner is somewhat analogous to creating a Totten"
trust in a savings bank, merely tentative and always subject to revoca-
tion by the true owner.74 Such a designation should not limit the present
interest of the owner in the bond.
(4) Other Bonds-Government, Corporate, Municipal
Checks for interest on registered bonds can be deposited by the minor
or in his name.7" The Banking Law is not equally, specific about coupons,
although as bearer paper they can be easily cashed for him by his parents.
So can proceeds of sale or at maturity of bearer bonds, but not without
the inherent risks that accompany other unauthorized dealings with the
minor's property. Collection of proceeds or transfer of registered bonds
may present about the same problems as transfer of stocks. One tangen-
tial point might be mentioned. When the gross income of the infant
exceeds $599 his parents "lose" him as a dependent for income tax
purposes.76 The loss of a $600 credit for a dependent may be costly to
them. As the infant's income approaches $600, tax exempt bonds as a
medium for gifts or of investment may result in a materially better family
income tax result.
(5) Life Insurance Policies and Premiums
The gift of a conventional life insurance policy, if complete and
outright, would appear to be one of a present interest.7 This would
70. See note 69 supra.
71. 31 CODEFED. REGS§ 315.45 (a) (1949).
72. Cf. Skouras v. Commissioner, 188 F. 2d 831 (2d Cir. 1951).
73. Matter of Totten, 179 N.Y. 112, 71 N. E. 748 (1904).
74. 31 CODE FED. REGS § 315.46 (1949).
75. See note 53 supra.
76. INT. REV. CODE § 25 (b) (1) (D). Revenue Act of 1951 raised this limit from
$499. See Blumberg, Popular Estate Delusions, 90 TRUSTS AND ESTATES 368 (1951).
77. Arthur A. Frank, P-H 1944 TC Maa. DEC. U1 44,360 (1944); Sidney R. Baer, P-H
1943 TC MEmi. DEC. ff 43,294 (1943), aff'd mem., 149 F. 2d 637 (8th Cir. 1945). U. S.
Treas. Reg. 108, § 86.11 (1943), states: "The term [future interests] has no reference to
such contractual rights as exist in . . . a policy of life insurance, the obligations of which
are to be discharged in the future," but warns that a future interest may be created by the
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seem true regardless of whether the policy is single premium, limited
payment, ordinary life or endowment. Premiums paid on such a policy
after the gift would also seem to be present interests and to constitute
additional gifts." A gift of a life insurance policy is frequently effected
by a written assignment recorded at the home office of the company, but
is sometimes made by originally "taking out" the policy in the name of
the donee as owner. 9
The Regulations prescribe amethod for valuing life insurance policies. 0
The payment of premiums would seem to be self-valuing."' The gift of a
policy at a time when it had no cash value was held to be a gift of a
future interest.8" That holding would probably be followed even though
the policy there under consideration was also subject to joint control of
more than one beneficiary-owner, which alone ordinarily delineates a
future interest and thus precludes any benefit of the exclusionya
Most companies will write many forms of policies on the lives of
minors."4 Insurance on the life of the donor or on the life of another
person in the family group can also be the subject of the gift.
"instrument of transfer employed in effecting a gift." See Becker, Gifts of Life Insurance,
5 JouRNAL or = A c"AN SoC Y oF CH nwzn L= Uxozwvn=rns 323 (1951), for a
discussion including valuation.
78. Sidney R. Baer, supra note 77.
79. An "insurable interest" is usually required by company practice, at least when
the policy is first put in force in order to have a valid contract of insurance. For a case
illustrating the rule of some jurisdictions that any beneficiary must have an insurable
interest, see the long battle culminating in Griffin et al. v. McCoach, 123 F. 2d 550
(5th Cir. 1941). Although it cannot be recommended, a le s formal asgnment by manual
delivery of a policy of which the insured's estate was the beneficiary has been held to
effectuate a valid gift. Rothstone v. Norton, 231 App. Div. 59, 246 N.Y. Supp. 354 (Ist
Dep't 1930), aff'd without opinion, 256 N.Y. 601, 177 N. E. 157 (1931) (policy on life
of Arnold Rothstein).
80. U. S. Treas. Reg. 108, § S6.19 (i) (1943). See 2 PAuL, FamnenL EsTAT" AnD Girr
TAxAroN 1266 (1942); id. 779 (Supp. 1946). U. S. Treas. Reg. 103, §§ 86.24, 86.26 (1943)
- require filing a statement from the insurance company on form 938 with every policy
of insurance listed on the return.
81. Sidney R. Baer, P-H 1943 TC ME . DEc. ff 43,294 (1943); U. S. Treas. Reg. 103, §
86.2 (a) (8) (1943).
82. Nashville Trust Co., P-H 1943 TC Af=x. DEc. f 43,485 (1943).
83. Spyros P. Skouras, 14 T. C. 523 (1950), aff'd, 1SS F. 2d 831 (2d Cir. 1951).
84. Most companies are believed to have self-imposed restrictions, related generally to
insurable interests and to the amount of insurance on the life of the parent or other person
effectuating the insurance. Under N.Y. INSUPMICE LAw §§ 145, 146, 147, the general
scheme is [§ 145] to permit a minor over fifteen to deal freely with insurance on his own
life with a few restrictions on the designation of beneficiaries, to permit [§ 145 (2)] the
insurance company to pay up to $2,000 per year directly to a minor beneficiary of eighteen
or over, to limit severely [§ 147] the amount of valid insurance on the lives of very young
infants but gradually to increase the limit as the child grows older, fixing the limit in part
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If funds are needed for the expenses and education of the infant donee
the appointment of a legal guardian will ordinarily be required to cash
in or borrow on the policies or even to collect the proceeds of a policy on
the life of another. An exception would be when the infant took out
the insurance himself and by statute as in New York," or by company
rule, can deal directly with the company.8 Practices and requirements of
the companies vary widely one from another.87 Before effecting insurance
on their lives or giving insurance policies to minors, the donor would be
well advised to inform himself as to the company rules for payment of
cash values, principal sums or installments to minors or their representa-
tives."8 With this exception insurance contracts require minimum in-
tervention for management and seem well suited to the needs of minor
donees. 9
Annuity type policies are also of many kinds. First is the ordinary
single premium annuity, payments on which begin immediately. If every
right in such a contract is transferred to the donee it would seem a gift
of a present interest. Another type is the deferred annuity, either single
or multiple premium, which has an immediate cash surrender or refund
value. The same rule would seem to apply. A third group is typified by
a contract, either single or multiple premium, providing for annuity pay-
ments to begin at a future specified age such as 65, but without immediate
cash surrender value. No recent case has been found, but the imperfect
analogy to an interest in an accumulation trust suggests an element of
future rather than present enjoyment in the gift of such a contract or
in a gift through the payment of premiums on it."
(6) Tangible Personal Property
In the law school case of Hlamer v. Sidway,91 the elder Story wrote his
by reference to the amount of insurance on the life of the one effectuating the insurance,
and to define insurable interests in the lives of minors under fifteen. New York is said
to be the only state with such severe restrictions on insuring the lives of minors. A bill
to increase the amount of valid insurance on the lives of minors was passed by the 1951
New York Legislature but vetoed by the Governor.
85. N.Y. INsURANCE LAW § 145.
86. N.Y. INSURANCE LAW § 145 (2).
87. FuTCPAsT, MANUA OF SETTLMENT OPTIONS (1950) quotes 45 of 60 companies as
answering an unqualified "no" to the question, "May periodic payments be made direct to
the minor beneficiary?" despite N.Y. INsuAcE LAW § 145 (2).
88. Similar precautions should be taken before naming young infants as either contingent
or primary beneficiaries of insurance.
89. Fleming, supra note 11, at 555, includes an extensive study on insurance. See
Becker, supra note 77.
90. Cf. Roberts v. Commissioner, 143 F. 2d 657 (Sth Cir. 1944). If gifts are made In
cash, subsequent use of part of the cash to pay such premiums might be distinguishable,
91. 124 N.Y. 538, 541, 27 N. E. 256 (1891).
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nephew in 1875 :12 "One thing more. Twenty-one years ago I bought you
15 sheep. These sheep were put out to double every four years. I kept
track of them the first eight years; I have not heard much about them
since. Your father and grandfather promised me that they would look
after them till you were of age. 3 Have they done so? I hope they have.
By this time you have between five and six hundred sheep, 4 worth a nice
little income this spring. Willie, I have said much more than I expected
to; hope you can make out what'I have written.... Truly Yours, W. E.
Story." With 500 sheep and wool over $3.00 a pound in Spring 1951, a
college education for the donee seems possible.
Antiques, stamps, paintings or rare books might be given. Selling
such chattels without the intervention of a legal guardian might well
involve an innocent purchaser in later trouble?5 as well as subjecting the
meddler" to the risks previously discussed. But what about storage,
repairs, insurance, wear and tear? Gifts of such things, like the sheep,
often require attention, care and management. An outright gift of tan-
gible personal property would seem to qualify as one of a present interest.
(7) Real Estate
In the eyes of the law, real property enjoys historical precedence that
is sometimes hard for a harassed landlord to understand, 7 but as the
subject matter of a gift to an infant, it has limitations as well as advan-
tages. Unlike a few kinds of personal property mentioned above, even
unimproved lots or woodlands are likely to require some management.
Who, for example, is to pay the taxes? Improved real property, too,
normally requires management, but Tertius' father, when he undertakes
to make leases, collect rents, pay taxes, insurance and repairs without a
court appointment as a guardian, is in far better position than he might
find himself in regard to personal property. Section 80 of the New York
Domestic Relations Law names him s officially as "Guardian in Socage?.
If the infant has no general guardian, the guardian in socage is authorized
by the statute to exercise certain limited powers over the property with-
92. Id. at 541, 27 N. E. at 256.
93. Quaere, Would a gift subject to this promise create a future interest? Cf. Ale.xander
v. Commissioner, 190 F. 2d 753 (5th Cir. 1951) (income tax).
94. Seventy-six years later 500 sheep appear again, this time as gifts to each of four
minor children, in the income tax case of Visintainer v. Commissioner, 187 F. 2d 519 (10th
Cir. 1951), rev'g, 13 T. C. 805 (1950). Certiorari applied for.
95. Matter of Goodchild, 160 Misc. 738, 290 N.Y. Supp. 633 (Surr. Ct. 1936).
96. Sherman v. Ballou, 8 Cow. 304 (N.Y. 1828).
97. Personal property, for example, always used to be and often still is sold first to
pay debts and expenses of decedents' estates.
98. The statute specifies in order, (1) parents jointly, (2) surviving parent, (3)
nearest and eldest relative of full age. N.Y. Domr. REL. LAW § 80.
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out calling on the machinery of legal guardianship. These powers, how-
ever, do not include power of sale. The minor cannot give a good title
without the assistance both of the court and of a "special" or general
legal guardian. 9
(8) Corporate Stocks
Elder would incline towards stock, perhaps of his own corporation, as
a medium for his gift partly because of the generous dividends he ex-
pects for his grandson. No problems ordinarily arise at the time of the
gift when he instructs the transfer agent, directly or through his bank
or broker, to register 30 shares of his XYZ Company in the name of
Tertius Jones.' ° Cashing dividend checks for small sums or depositing
them in an account in the name of the minor normally presents no prac-
tical problem.
However, if later it seems desirable to sell the stock for investment
reasons or if principal is needed for college expenses it may be necessary
to appoint a legal guardian. As a practical matter this may often be
avoided if the minor is old enough to endorse the certificate or sign a
stock power and if, as is sometimes the case, the father's bank or broker
is willing to guarantee the signature. But since the guarantee is generally
regarded as covering legal capacity as well as the genuineness of the
signature, the bank or broker may be reluctant to assume this risk10'
and the father may be reluctant to make the request. Whether the court
would even then approve the use of the funds for tuition, board and
other college expenses-.principal funds of a minor in the hands of a
guardian cannot properly be expended without court order° 2 -may be
another matter. Unless college expenses are deemed "necessaries," court
approval of "such a sum as to the surrogate seems proper," 1 3 "differs
with the circumstances of each case." 104 A showing that the parent is
unable to maintain the infant is said to be essential. 10
There may be a practical alternative, however, in original registra-
99. N.Y. S-RRocAT's CouRT AcT § 194b, added in 1948, greatly simplifies the procedure
in the sale of an infant's real estate.
100. It is helpful if the donor will attach to the new stock certificates a memorandum
noting his own income tax "basis" for the stock, the date on which he acquired It,
the date of the gift and the value on that date.
101. E.g., Casey v. Kastel, 237 N.Y. 305, 142 N. E. 671 (1924).
102. In re Jarvis, 19 N.Y. S. 2d 183 (Surr. Ct. 1940).
103. N.Y. SuRROArm's CouRT AcT § 194.
104. Matter of Brown, 80 Misc. 4, 7, 141 N.Y. Supp. 193, 196 (Surr. Ct. 1913). See
also Matter of Lapides, 144 Misc. 19, 258 N.Y. Supp. 799 (Surr. Ct. 1932).
105. Matter of Brown, supra note 104. This is one of the causes of the concern of
some writers lest a gift to an infant through his guardian might be a future interest. See
note 11 rupra.
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tion of the shares in the name of a nominee.00 For example, when Elder
makes the gift he might have the 30 shares of XYZ Company endorsed
in blank or perhaps transferred into the name of "M. Smith Jones."
Mary Jones, n~e Smith, is the mother of Tertius. She is not an appointed
legal guardian. When Eider hands her the certificate he tells her the
stock is a gift to Tertius and that she is merely a nominee for her child,
neither the owner nor a trustee. He makes it clear to her that both
income and principal are exclusively his grandson's and are not in any
other way restricted. He suggests that she promptly put the Treasury
on notice as to the true ownership of the shares, and he hands her an
"Ownership Certificate," Treasury Department Form 1087, suggesting
that she keep a copy of it and also that she keep a careful record of all
transactions relating to the stock including a record of dividends and the
disposition of them. Perhaps he writes her a letter confirming this
conversation. If the stock is endorsed in blank she will proceed to have
it transferred to this unusual form of her name (or, of course, if she
dislikes the nominee role, to the name of her son).
If at a later date it seems wise or becomes necessary to sell the stock
no problems should arise in relation to the transfer agent, as the regis-
tered owner, M. Smith Jones, is a competent adult and the only person
known to the bank, broker or transfer agent as having any interest what-
ever in that certificate. Proceeds of the sale can be deposited in an
account in the name of the minor0 7 or Mary can reinvest the proceeds,
filing new 1087 forms for the new investments. She should continue to
keep careful records showing that the new investments are also Tertius'
and that the income has been spent or saved for him alone.
Such a course of action is not without certain risks, but at least permits
freedom of investment action and has the merit of convenience and
simplicity. Risks appear on four fronts.
(a) The minority risk.
When Tertius reaches majority or when a legal guardian may be
appointed for him before then, either may demand of Mary an account-
ing. The market value of the stock may have declined severely. She
will find herself in a vulnerable position, and she may have to make
good to the infant both the proceeds of transactions that turned out to
his advantage and the cost of any that turned out badly. Possibly she
will have to make good on income not earned or alleged to have been
improperly spent.
106. Shattuck, supra note 7, seriously doubts the wisdom of any kind of informal
arrangement by which the minor's property is to be kept in manageable form.
107. N.Y. BA.xrxnm LAw §§ 134, 239. See note 53 supra.
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(b) The income tax risk. Mary will receive dividends on property
belonging to her son. Her filing of Form 1087, her other records, a
separate bank account for the infant's money, should be a sufficient
defense to an assertion of income tax against her.108
(c) The gift tax risk. It may be contended, although there is support
for a contrary view,'01 that no part of the gift in her name as nominee is
a gift of a present interest to Tertius. This contention might be based
on the theory that Elder had inadvertently created a trust.110 If Elder
is in a high gift tax bracket this is serious.
(d) The estate tax risk. If Mary Jones dies it might be contended
that the stock was hers and includible in her gross estate. The con-
tention is obviously without merit, but is plausible should she fail to
keep records, and would perhaps be difficult to counter.1 ' However,
unless her taxable estate exceeds the statutory $60,000 exemption, the
federal tax consequences would not be severe.
Despite these risks the procedure commends itself for its simplicity,
and in a proper case may be a practical solution to the problem of
gifts of stock.
It may be that real estate can be handled similarly. The "straw" man
is a common device in real estate transactions in some sections of the
country. A nominee is only a "straw" with a less colorful appellation.
Normally the "straw" signs an agreement to convey to the true
owner on demand. A declaration disclaiming any interest and naming
the true owner might be a useful adjunct to Mary's post as nominee. 1 2
108. See Visintainer v. Commissioner, 187 F. 2d 519 (10th Cir. 1951), for an xample
of the usefulness of records. The regulations specifically require donors to keep "permanent
books of account or records" of their gifts. U. S. Treas. Reg. 108, § 86.25 (1943).
Alexander v. Commissioner, 190 F. 2d 753 (5th Cir. 1951), recites an entertaining
success story of an infant rancher. Records were well kept and appear to have figured
largely in the result. The case seems unique in its line because the expression "natural
guardian" is never used. Certiorari applied for in the Visintainer case.
109. Cf. John E. Daniels, P-H 1951 TC MEm. DEc. J 51,044 (1951); Prudence Miller,
7 T. C. 1245 (1946) (income tax question but closely related) ; Strekalovsky v. Delaney,
78 F. Supp. 556 (D. Mass. 1948); Kieckhefer v. Commissioner, 189 F. 2d 118 (Ith Cir.
1951); Cannon v. Robertson, 98 F. Supp. 331 (D. N. C. 1951).
110. Cf. Curtis A. Herberts, 10 T. C. 1053, 1063 (1948); Lawrence Miller, 2 T. C.
285 (1943); and John E. Daniels, supra note 109, wherein parents were held unable to
place in trust property owned by infant children. It is, however, the general rule that no
special words are necessary to create a trust. 1 Scott, LAW or TRUsr § 24 (1939).
111. If Mary dies, a "reverse discovery" proceeding (N.Y. SUaRoGATE'S CoUar ACT
§ 206-a) may be necessary to gain possession of these certificates for Tertius from the
executor of his mother's estate.
112. The Trustee's agreement to turn the property over to the infant or to his guardian
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A Deed of Gift
When executed with certain formalities n1 a document appointing
Mary or another as "nominee" or "custodian" of Tertius' 30 shares of
XYZ Company stock dignifies the "straw" concept as that of a "donee
of a power in trust."" 4 Although the statutory provisions covering such
powers in New York are collected in the Real Property Law," they have
been held to apply equally to personal property.10 The "power in trust"
is a familiar device to New York draftsmen. In the standard "minority
holdover" provision in wills and trust agreements, it is often used for
dealing with the property of minors when management is needed and
the permitted limits to the rule against perpetuities may have been
exhausted."
7
It would be impossible to advise a client with any certainty that
100% of a gift under such a power constitutes a present interest for
the purpose of the gift tax exclusion,1 8 as no case appears to have come
before the courts on the precise facts. Perhaps the closest analogy is
found in the instruments considered in the Prudence Miller,"0 and Streka-
lovsk_ 20 and Cannon'2' cases, all of which support an inference that
the infant would receive 100% present interest. The rationale of the
Seventh Circuit in Kieckhefer v. Commnissioner -y 22 also seems applicable,
and there Chief Judge Major certainly appears to go much further than
would seem necessary to sustain the present interest in a gift to an infant
under such a deed. A gift under this power would not seem to fall
within the definition of a "future interest" in the Regulations," for the
on written demand was sufficient to give the infant a present interest in the Kieckhefer
trust. Kieclhefer v. Commissioner, 189 F. 2d 118 (7th Cir. 1951). Note that the Tax Court
in Arthur C. Stifel, 17 T.C. No. 71 (Oct. 10, 1951), has refused to follow the Kiechhefer case
The existence of such a paper might eliminate need for the "reverse discovery" procceding
discussed in note 111 supra.
113. N.Y. REAL PRop. LAw § 140.
114. Matter of Babbage, 125 N. Y. L. J. 2232, Col. 3 (Surf. Ct. June 14, 1951), contains
an interesting discussion of a "power in trust" under a vwill. It suggests that bond may he
dispensed with by the terms of a gift to Tertius through his guardian.
115. N. . Rn .. PROP. LAW ART. 5; N.Y. SuRR00oo'Is CoURT Aer § 194 a.
116. Cutting v. Cutting, 86 N.Y. 522 (1881) ; Hutton v. Benakhard, 92 N.Y1". 295 (18I3).
117. TwEED AND PARsoxs, Ln== AND TE.sTA2uTARY ESTATE PL ,i-m 16, 118
(1950); FINGAR AND BOOKSTAVER, NEW YoRK WILLS §§ 105.4-7, 146.32 (1949); Goa.ne.,
STANDARD A-xiOTATED Fo s oF Wrars 6, 9, 204 (1947).
118. See note 8 supra.
119. 7 T. C. 1245 (1946) (income tax).
120. 78 F. Supp. 556 (D. Mass. 1948).
121. 98 F. Supp. 331 (W.D. N.C. 1951).
122. 189 F. 2d 118 (7th Cir. 1951).
123. The Regulations do not undertake to define a present interest, but they do
comment on its counterpart. "Future interests," they say, "is a legal term, and indudes
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deed would impose no time limitation, it would give a right to immediate
use, possession and enjoyment. With or without such a deed the nominee
registration provides a simple mechanism to convert the stock to money
and in turn to the needs of its owner. For this purpose it may be superior
to the legal guardianship which needs the intervention of a court order
as well as, at least in theory, a showing of inability of the parents to
provide support before the principal of the investment can be of imme-
diate physical use to the infant. Essentially the deed of gift is merely
a device to circumvent the transfer agent who is forced to prevent the
transfer of the infant's stock if he knows it belongs to an infant.
Other Methods of Registration
For many years members of one of the oldest law firms in the State of
New York have acted as trustees for numerous clients. Using a bank as
custodian, the firm has also acted as nominee or agent for others. Books
of account are kept, bills and insurance premiums paid, tax returns pre-
pared, all in the tradition of the English family solicitor. Some of these
clients have made outright gifts to minor friends and relatives. The
individually owned property of the minors is managed in much the same
way as the individually owned property of adult clients. Stocks and
bonds are bought and sold, income tax and information returns are regu-
larly filed, and when the infants become twenty-one the arrangement
usually continues without change except that reports are sent to the
actual owner instead of to his natural guardian. Members of the firm
are well aware of the business risks involved but feel that in view of the
close relationship between the firm, its clients and their families the
service is natural and justified and under such circumstances actual
experience has shown the risk to be inconsequential. The method
deserves consideration in appropriate cases.
A more common method is for the parent to keep the securities given
to the infant in a "special" or other separate account with a bank or
broker.12' Transferability is maintained because the financial institution
reversions, remainders, and other interests or estates, whether vested or contingent, and
whether or not supported by a particular interest or estate, which are limited to commence
in use, possession or enjoyment at some future date or time. The term has no reference to
such contractual rights as exist in a bond, note (though bearing no interest until maturity),
or in a policy of life insurance, the obligations of which are to be discharged by payment
in the future. But a future interest or interests in such contractual obligations may be
created by the limitations contained in a trust or other instrument of transfer employed in
effecting a gift." U. S. Treas. Reg. 108, § 86.11 (1943). See excellent discussion of future
interests in 3 MONTGOMERY, FEDERAL TAXES--ESTATES, TRUSTS AND Gis 1005 el seq. (1951).
124. Cf. Edward H. Heller, 41 B. T. A. 1020 (1940). In Emil Frank, 27 B. T. A. 1158
(1933), the broker was informed of the true ownership as he was in Delafield v. Barret,
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has no means of knowing that the property belongs to a minor. It would
be unjust without some notice to hold it in any way responsible. The
records of the parent-nominee including tax returns should be complete
and careful, but the burden of record keeping is greatly simplified by
allowing all dividends, interest, credits and charges to go through the
bank or brokerage account where they are recorded in detail. It is
believed that few individuals using this method have consistently filed
the Treasury Form 1087 ownership record mentioned earlier. It is
recommended they do so as standard practice.
When it seems likely that no sale will be necessary until the infant
becomes of age, the donor can simply register the stock in the name of
the infant donee.2'' Should sale become essential a guardian can be
appointed if other methods of attaining transferability fail. In this con-
nection investment company shares are frequently desirable, as they
ordinarily provide broad diversification among issues and can be selected
to provide diversification in the type of securities within the portfolio
of the company. 6 Continuous investment management is provided. The
combination would seem to make them suitable for retention as a semi-
permanent form of investment. Occasionally an investment company
can be found whose officers will guarantee the signature of a minor if
redemption or sale of the shares during minority becomes necessary.
Not unlike the partners of the law firm mentioned earlier they may be
willing to accept the business risk as an accommodation to a valued
customer.
Partnership Interests
After its severe relapse under the impact of Towe 127 and Lusthaus1'
in 1946, Cidbertson v. Conmissione' 2 revived interest in the family
partnership as a tax-saving device. "Practical" advice might be to avoid
gifts to young minors of partnership interests without retaining, ready
270 N. Y. 43, 200 N. E. 67 (1936). N. Y. Doi. Pn. LAW § 85 was amended to overcome
in part the latter case.
125. John E. Daniels, P-H 1951 TC MInE. Dnc. ff 51,044 (1951); Curtis A. Herberts,
10 T. C. 1053 (1948) ; Lawrence Miller, 2 T. C. 285 (1943).
126. The range of choice is wide. At one extreme are companies with portfolios
exclusively of institutional grade bonds, at the other are those with largely common stock
portfolios against which bonds or preferred stocks or both are outstanding in addition
to the common stock of the investment company. Various descriptions of balanced funds
and stock funds come in between.
127. Commissioner v. Tower 327 U. S. 280 (1946).
128. Lusthaus v. Commissioner, 327 U. S. 293 (1946).
129. 337 U. S. 733 (1949). The Revenue Act of 1951 contains provisions designed to
clarify the rules governing family partnerships.
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for instant use, (1) a mature specialist in federal tax litigation and (2)
any "saved" taxes.
Summary of Outright Gifts
The foregoing is by no means an exhaustive review of the field of
outright gifts to minors. It suggests six main points:
First, despite its safeguards of strict court supervision,' 30 legal guar-
dianship at least in some jurisdictions is cumbersome, out-of-pocket
expense may be high and hidden investment penalties may be costly.
Second, unless gifts are confined to United States Savings Bonds, single
premium insurance policies or bank deposits in the name of the minor,
some form of management intervention, such as periodic payments, sale,
lease, collection, repair, disbursement, storage or safekeeping, is likely
to be needed.
Third, investment company shares deserve consideration as a medium
for such gifts, with or without a guardianship.
Fourth, with few exceptions, one attempting to manage a minor's own
property without court authority takes a genuine and potentially serious
financial risk.
Fifth, even where there seems to be no doubt that every possible
property right has been given over to the immediate, complete and
present ownership of the minor, unless there is a guardian to receive the
property there is usually no one who can with orthodox propriety deal
with it to make it most useful to the donee. Sometimes, as with a stock
certificate or a parcel of real estate, the property will be frozen and
unavailable for sale until a guardian is appointed. A contention, there-
fore, that such a gift is entirely one of a future interest, or that at most
the only present interest in the gift is the right to income on it for life,
is not as far-fetched as it might seem. No case seems to have gone so
far, but in effect that contention has been made both by taxpayers"
130. "To aid and protect them, the court is ever ready to listen to their appeals, Its
hands are always near to lead them in paths of safety, its doors are evermore ajar, awaiting
the tread of every child to whom a wrong has been done. In the closed bud of their
unblossomed years lie sleeping, dreaming, the good or ill whose fruit may hereafter ripen
upon the tree of life, and it is the duty of the court to see that the heritage which some
father or mother has left them shall nourish its roots and make shapely the boughs from
which the harvest must be gathered." In re Bushnell, 4 N. Y. Supp, 472, 479 (Surr. Ct.
1888). Despite any inference from this quotation, the case has an excellent outline of the
duties of guardians. Id. at 477.
131. Ashcraft v. Allen, 90 F. Supp. 543 (M.D. Ga. 1950) (taxpayer unsuccessful in
contention that trust created present interest because it gave infant everything possible
under Georgia law). Similar arguments in Fondren et al. v. Commissioner, 324 U. S. is,
29 (1945), were brushed aside by the court as irrelevant.
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and by the commissioner l 2 Subjectively, it is obvious that if Tertius is
young enough his past, present and future interests merge within his crib.
It was, however, a more objective test laid down by Mr. Justice Rut-
ledge in Fondren et al. v. ConznzimsSioner' 3 when he asked for some "right
to substantial present economic benefit" as prerequisite to finding a
present interest. Economic benefit is about as objective as one can get.
With a guardian or without one, when the infant alone actually owns
the property or when the income is his absolutely any objective test
seems to be met.
Sixth, nevertheless counsel should consider the advisability of filing
gift tax returns for outright gifts to minors even when well within the
annual exclusions. Gifts near the $3,000 limit might be deliberately
increased by enough to require filing a return. This procedure would
put the statute of limitations in motion and thus appear to give some
protection against the possibility of an outright gift to an infant some day
being held to be a gift of a future interest.
PART II-THE SmAL TRuST
This brings us to an examination of the small trust as a means of
making gifts. It will be irrevocable, at least by the grantor. Objections
to a small trust might include:
(1) The cost seems high. Corporate trustees, at least in large cities,
usually have schedules of minimum fees that seem a heavy burden on
a trust of $3-10,000.
(2) Diversification and supervision of investments is difficult and
is expensive both for the trustee and for the beneficiaries.
(3) The investment, bookkeeping and diversification problems which
impose heavy costs on the professional trustee, impose heavy burdens
on the non-professional. As a result the donor who might otherwise ask
132. Kieckhefer v. Commissioner, 189 F. 2d 118 (7th Cir. 1951); John E. Danels,
P-H 1951 TC Atm. DEc. f 51,044 (1951); Chas. F. Roeser, 2 T. C. 298 (1943).
133. 324 U. S. 18, 20 (1945) (italics supplied). During the first nine months of 1951
the courts seem to have confirmed this point of vieiv in Daniels, Kiechhefer and Cannon
(gift tax), and in Visintainer and Alexander (income tax), three of them Circuit Court
reversals of the Tax Court and all in favor of taxpayers. No case on comparable facts
seems to have gone the other way until in October the Tax Court, in Arthur C. Stifel, Jr.,
17 T.C. No. 71 (Oct. 10, 1951), with Black, Arundell and Johnston dissenting, refused to
follow the Seventh Circuit's decision in the Kieckhefer case. As there is a real substantive
difference between outright ownership and beneficial ownership through a trust, no
matter how the trust is phrased, and as there is a shadowy area of interpretation as to
whether the limitations imposed on the gifts in Stifel and Kieckhefer were in fact imposed
by the grantor as the Tax Court seems to have thought, or whether they were merely
the result of the infant-donee's legal disabilities as the Seventh Circuit believed, the
decision in Stifel is still far from saying that an outright gift to an infant is a gift of a
future interest.
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his lawyer, a business associate or a friend to serve as trustee of a small
trust seldom does so.
(4) Income tax problems raised by Helvering v. Cliflord and the
"Clifford" regulations.13 4
(5) Income tax problems springing from Helvering v. Stuart.18
(6) Estate tax problems, primarily those of § 811(c),(d) of the
Internal Revenue Code. 130
(7) Custody, bond, successor trusteeship, etc.
(8) Uncertainties as to future legislation and judicial action.
(9) A $3,000 gift in trust will ordinarily qualify for less than $3,000
of annual exclusion for gift tax purposes, as a part or all of it will be a
"future interest in property." 37
(10) A gift tax return must be filed if there is a transfer of any
"future interest" whatever. 138
This is a formidable list. They are known to and recognized by vir-
tually every lawyer and trust officer, and many are known, suspected or
feared by prospective donors. Objections (1), (2) and (3) may be
considered together. The difficulty and excessive cost of administration
and diversification, as well as the heavy burden on non-professional
trustees, can now all be met by investment in shares of an investment
company,139 or when one is available, in a .discretionary common trust
134. 309 U. S. 331 (1940); U.S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.22 (a) (1943), T. D. 5567, 1947-2
Cum. BULL. 10. The substance of the Clifford rule as set out in the Regulations
is that income of a trust may be taxed to the grantor because of (1) the short duration
of the trust if it may revert to the grantor, or (2) the power to change beneficial interests,
or (3) a power of administrative control that can be exercised primarily for the benefit
of the grantor. See STANLEY AND KILiCULLEN, THE FEDERAL INCOmE TAX 269, 272 (1948)
(also c. 8 forthcoming 1951 ed.).
135. 317 U. S. 154 (1942). The substance of the Stuart rule as modified by INT. Rav.
CODE § 167 (c), added in 1943, is that when the donor of a trust is legally obligated to
support the beneficiary, in a father-donor, child-donee situation for example, any trust
income used for the child's support, i.e., in discharge of the father's legal obligation to
support the child, will be taxed to the father-donor.
136. The somewhat oversimplified substance of the estate tax tests for trusts is that the
trust shall not have (1) been created in contemplation of death, (2) been intended to take
effect in possession or enjoyment at or after the donor's death, (3) reserved the right to
the income for the donor, or to discharge legal obligations of the donor, (4) reserved
to the donor as trustee or otherwise any right to change beneficial interests, or (5) reserved
to the donor power to alter, amend, revoke or terminate. U. S. Treas. Reg. 105, § 81.15
(1942). See Schneider, The Inter Vivos Trust for a Minor-Its Estate Tax Aspect, 28 TAXES
825 (1950).
137. An exception may be a "Strekalovsky," "Cannon" or "Kieckhefer" trust briefly
discussed later.
138. U. S. Treas. Reg. 108, § 86.20 (1943).
139. This remark should not be construed as a promise of profitable investment results,
Diversification does not protect against market risks. Management fees and acquisition
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fund. 4 ' Often the most practical procedure is to create a trust providing
that (a) the corpus shall consist of or shall be invested in shares of the
"Prudent Investment Fund," (b) the shares may (shall) be held, and
(c) the income shall be accumulated and may (shall) be invested in
additional shares of the same Fund until the infant beneficiary attains a
stated age. It is difficult to imagine any arrangement for a gift to a
minor less burdensome or easier to manage.'41
The "eat your cake and have it, too" trust has had a deservedly rough
road. But there can be no certainty that any inter vivos gift in trust
will be free from unexpected income or estate tax consequences. These
hazards, mentioned as objections (4), (5) and (6), have been carefully
analyzed and adequately pointed out.' The estate tax implications of
the leading income tax cases, Clifford and Stuart, are still unresolved.
The rationale of Douglas v. Willcuts' can easily be expanded to impose
an estate tax on any trust of which the income might be used to dis-
charge the legal obligations of the grantor. Thus far, however, the courts
have refused to extend the Clifford case into the estate tax field and have
restricted the application of Douglas v. Willcuts 4  to similar facts.O 4
Care in drafting is certainly essential to provide as complete a severance of
ties to the grantor as possible, and so is an administration of the trust that
will reject any conceivable benefits to the grantor in favor of all possible
benefits to the beneficiary. 40  The practical approach would seem to be
costs of investment company shares should also be considered in computing and comparing
costs.
140. These are operated by corporate trustees to facilitate investment and provide
broad diversification for small trusts; the number is growing rapidly but there are still
fewer than 100.
141. For suggestions as to drafting provisions for capital gain dividends of investment
companies, see Rogers, Capital Gain Dividends-A Suggestion for Draftsmen, 20 FonD.
L. REv. 79 (1951) or 90 TRusTs & ESTATES 300 (1951).
142. See especially Shattuck, supra note 7; Fleming, supra note 11, at 561 et seq;
Schneider, supra note 136.
143. 296 U.S. 1 (1935); U.S. Treas. Reg. 105 § 81.18 (1942) (as amended by T. D.
5741, 1949-2 Cumr. BuLL. 114); Helvering v. Mercantile-Commerce Bank & Trust Co.
et al., 111 F.2d 224 (8th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 654 (1940).
144. 296 U. S. 1 (1935).
145. Cf. Commissioner v. Douglass Estate, 143 F. 2d 961 (3d Cir. 1944). The cautious
draftsman may wish to include in the agreement a prohibition against use of any income
to discharge legal obligations of the grantor, such as support of infant beneficiaries.
146. Substantially (and oversimplified), if both income and principal are for the
beneficiary alone or for his estate (without reference to the donor's death), if no one other
than the beneficiary or his guardian can alter, amend or revoke the trust, if the donor
can not deal with or use the trust for his own benefit or to discharge his own legal
obligations, and if the income is in fact not used to discharge legal obligations of the grantor,
the income will presumably be taxed to the trustee or beneficiary and the trust corpus,
1951]
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to recognize that the apparent opportunities for tax saving may prove
temporary or illusory. There is little to lose taxwise if hopes are dis-
appointed, and much may be gained if other objectives of the donor are
furthered, especially if the tax fears do not materialize.
Objection (7) is again largely a problem of draftsmanship. Exemp-
tion from bond would seem to be normal, one or two nominations for
successor trustees might be made, and the trustee should always be autho-
rized to employ a bank custodian. If the trust is not so small as to make
corporate trusteeship seem too expensive, many problems will be solved
or reduced by appointment of a corporate trustee.147
The uncertainties of the future, objection (8), so far as they relate
to taxes, have little more to do with gifts in trust than with any other
form of gift. Proposals for the integration of gift and estate taxes have
not discriminated against gifts in trust.148 As to future uncertainties of
investment and management of the property, it is obviously wise to
equip the trustee with broad discretionarypowers, bearing in mind the
admonition of Professor Leach that "To regulate events in 1960 the judg-
ment of a mediocre mind on the spot is incomparably preferable to the
guess in 1940 of the greatest man who ever lived.' '149
Objections (9) and (10), relating to loss of exclusions and the prob-
able necessity for filing returns, are doubtless the greatest psychological
obstacles to the use of trusts for small gifts. If the prospective donor
has a large estate, has numerous prospective minor donees, and is already
in a high gift tax bracket, and especially if he plans a continuing program
of annual gifts, the multiple $3,000 ($6,000 if married)1"' exclusions
should be cherished as they may be valuable tax-saving tools."8' But a
large majority of donors are not in that position. They are likely to
have used little or none of their lifetime exemption of $30,000 ($60,000
aside from questions of contemplation of death, will presumably be outside the grantor's
estate. See notes 134, 135 and 136 supra on the Clifford and Stuart cases and estate tax
rules.
147. Corporate trustees are frequently available for trusts of $3,000 to $10,000 only
at minimum rates that often seem disproportionately high. Corporate trusteeship should
always be considered for convenience and safety and for the disinterested position of the
fiduciary.
148. JOINT STUDY ON INTEGRATION OF ESTATE AND Gwr TAxAnroN, Gov't. printing
office (1947).
149. LFAcH, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FUrRE 1 4maxsrs 240 (2d ed. 1940).
150. INT. REv. CoDE § 1000 (f), U. S. Treas. Reg. 108 § 86.3a (1943), T.D. 5698 I
4, 1949-1 Cum. BULL. 228.
151. Mr. and Mrs. Fondren had made gifts to seven grand-children "of tender years"
and fought vainly for exclusions all the way through the Supreme Court. Fondren ot al.
v. Commissioner, 324 U. S. 18 (1945).
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if married).. 2 and-this is the important point-probably never will use
all of it. They will not use it all because they just do not have enough
total wealth to afford to give away $60,000 in addition to their outright
gifts to competent adults and to charities.
Assuming this to be true, many advantageous opportunities to make
gifts in trust have been rejected because the donor was correctly advised
that if made in trust (a) his gift would be at least in part a gift of a
future interest and to that extent outside the annual exclusion, and
(b) a gift tax return would be required. While both propositions are
true, neither singly nor together do they seem important enough to
control his decision. As noticed earlier filing returns may be a wise
protective step even when not required.
Since 1948, if Elder uses the maximum permissible exclusion for any
single donee in any single year he will give $6,000 and his wife will
"consent" ' 1 3 to the use of her exclusion also for his gift. But if he gives
even $1 in excess of his own personal exclusion of $3,000 he must file a
return. 4 He must do so whether or not the donee is a minor and whether
or not the gift is in trust. Thus the filing requirement for a gift in trust
adds no real obstacle except that if the consent gift, no matter how
small, includes a future interest in property the consenting spouse must
also file a return.' =
As most donors are unlikely ever to use their entire $30-$60,000
lifetime exemption it is not too serious a matter to use a few thousand
dollars of it from time to time. It will otherwise be wasted. What better
use can one imagine than to facilitate the administration and investment
of a gift for an infant donee?
Some Observations on Present and Future interests
"Because of the many and varied ways in which gifts in trust may be
made and carried out, there can be no one simple rule to determine
whether a gift in trust is a gift of a present or a future interest, so
it becomes necessary in each case to examine the trust provisions and
decide each case on its own particular facts. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue v. Kempner, 5 Cir., 1942, 126 F. 2d 853. ' "100 Despite the repeti-
tion of this warning in one of the latest cases, there are certain rules
that seem well enough established to serve as guides 15 7
152. See note 150 supra.
153. See note 150 supra.
154. U. S. Treas. Reg. 108 § 86.20 (1943).
155. Id., T. D. 5698 9, 1949-1 Cum. Bu_.. 239.
156. Cannon v. Robertson, 98 F. Supp. 331,333 (D. N. C. 1951).
157. Dreyxer, The Exdusion Provision of the Gift Tax Law Needs Amending, 29 TA.E
743, 744 (1951).
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The Regulations provide methods of valuing "annuities, life estates,
remainders and reversions" ''  and include two tables captioned "A"
and "B"' "9 which may be used in making the necessary computations.
Income from trust property is termed a "Hypothetical Annuity" and
may be valued in approximately the same way as a true annuity.100 The
immediate right to income from a trust for life or for a term of years
has been held a present interest,61 whether or not the beneficiary is a
minor.0 2 Thus a conventional trust to pay income to Tertius for life,
remainder to X, is for our purposes divided into two parts. The right of
Tertius to the income computed in accordance with table "A" is a present
interest, while the right of X to the remainder is a future interest. 0 3 If
Tertius is ten years of age and is given the right to income for life in a
trust of $10,000, the computation of the value of his life estate requires
the following two steps:
First, to determine the number of dollars to be assumed as income
for one year.
$10,000 x 4% = $400
This annual 4% value of the income is arbitrary. The tables are
called 4% tables, which merely means that they assume a 4% yield.
Opposite age 10 (in column 1), column 2 of table "A" shows the actuarial
value that is to be attributed to an income of $1 per year for the life
of a beneficiary age 10. This is $19.45359. Inasmuch as our hypothetical
trust of $10,000 is presumed to yield, as above, $400 a year (whether in
fact at the time invested in Treasury Bills to yield 1.60% or in a stock
that yields 12%o), the value of the lifetime right to $400 annually at age
10 is determined by the second step.
158. U.S. Treas. Reg. 108 § 86.19 (f) (1943).
159. Id. at 36 (Table A), 37 (Table B).
160. Id. § 86.19 (f) (5).
161. Fisher v. Commissioner, 132 F. 2d 383 (9th Cir. 1942). See also Sensenbrenner v.
Commissioner, 134 F. 2d 883 (7th Cir. 1943), both cited with apparent approval by the
Supreme Court in Fondren et al. v. Commissioner, 324 U. S. 18, 21 (1945).
162. Commissioner v. Sharp, 153 F. 2d 163 (9th Cir. 1946). Should an outright gift
to an infant be held to constitute a future interest on the mere grounds of minority,
it would then seem to follow that the gift of trust income to a minor would also become
one of a future interest.
163. "The definition of 'future interests' reached over the centuries by the substantive law,
for its own purposes, and that reached in a few short years by the tax structure, for its own
purposes, are not identical. The tax regulations say that "'future interests' is a legal
term, and includes reversions, remainders, and other interests or estates, whether vested or
contingent, and whether or not supported by a particular interest or estate, which are
limited to commence in use, possession or enjoyment at some future date or time."
[Reg. 108, Sec. 86.11]." Shattuck, supra note 7, at 13.
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$19.45359 x 400 -$7,781.44
Thus, if Elder Jones sets up such a trust for a ten year old Tertius,
$7,781.44 will be the computed value of the infant's life estate. This is
a present interest, 64 and in computing his "net gifts" for the year, Elder
may subtract $3,000 (or $6,000 if his wife consents) from the total
value of his gift to Tertius, reporting only the balance as a "net gift."
The value of the remainder is a future interest, and as no exclusion
may be applied to it, it is always a part of his "net gifts."
To create a trust so that the entire corpus would be a present interest
it would seem necessary to give the beneficiary, if an adult, an immediate,
unfettered right to terminate the trust in his own favor. This right
given to an extremely young infant was held sufficient to accomplish
that result in the Kieckhefer trust.165 A few years earlier Mrs.
Strekalovsky made gifts for each of three minor children to a trustee
who was instructed to hold and administer the property as though
he were their guardian. The property was vested in the infants and
not subjected to defeasance. No distinction was to be made between
principal and income. There was no spendthrift provision. The trust
for each child would terminate on the demand or request of a legal
guardian, on the beneficiary reaching twenty-one or on the prior death of
the beneficiary. 6 A district court in Massachusetts held the transfer
to have been one of a present interest.'67
In June, 1951 this decision was followed in Cannon v. Robcrtson,2"
when a determined taxpayer fought through the District Court for a
refund of $5.39 (and interest) of allegedly improperly collected gift
taxes. The court found "well nigh identical facts" where the trustees
were to pay or apply such principal from time to time ".... as may be
approved and directed by the court . . . to the same extent and with
like effect as if the Trustees were the duly appointed Guardians of the
Estate of the said James William Cannon."'09 The exclusion was granted
and the refund won.
The Tax Court, however, in considering the Kieckhefer trust and
distinguishing it from the transfer under review in the Strekalovsky
case, evinced no enthusiasm for the Massachusetts decision." 0 The
164. See notes 161 and 162 supra, and Certain Assumptions, p. 235 supra.
165. Kieckhefer v. Commissioner, 189 F. 2d 118 (7th Cir. 1951). The Tax Court has
refused to follow the Kieckhefer case. See note 133 supra.
166. See Anderson, Gifts to Minors and Incompetents, 26 TA.'Ms 911 (1948).
167. Strekalovsky v. Delaney, 78 F. Supp. 556 (D. Mass. 1948).
168. 98 F. Supp. 331 (D. N. C. 1951).
169. Id. at 332.
170. 15 T. C. 111, 115 (1950), revd, 189 F. 2d 118 (7th Cir. 1951).
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Strekalovsky and Cannon cases seem correct. To hold otherwise would
obliterate substance by highly formal distinctions. If, as assumed through-
out this paper, a gift to a minor either outright or through his guardian
is a gift of a present interest, why should it be transmuted into a gift
of a future interest merely because it is made through a trustee whose
obligation to the beneficiary is the same as that of a guardian to his
ward ?171
The Kieckhefer trust provided for termination upon written demand
by the infant or on his behalf by a legally appointed guardian. Reversing
the Tax Court, the Seventh Circuit, with one dissent, granted the
taxpayer an exclusion for the corpus of the trust even though there
was no guardian when the trust was created, nor at the time of the trial.
The decision was placed squarely on the point that any restrictions on
the gift were not imposed by the donor but were "imposed by law due
to the fact that the beneficiary is incapable of acting on his own."' 1 2
These three appear to be the only recent cases in which the entire
corpus of a trust qualified for a gift tax exclusion. It seems to have been
difficult for draftsmen to achieve this result.1 3 But less aggressive tax-
payers would have been defeated in the Kieckhefer case at the Tax
Court level, and might have paid the $5.39 and tried another tack in
the Cannon case. The cases derive stature from the fact that they were
decided after the leading gift tax cases on future interests in the Supreme
Court.'7 4 Each was specifically distinguished on its facts.
Aside from these interesting exceptions, the maximum of present
interest in a trust for the benefit of a minor is obtained by giving a life
income and no more to the first beneficiary as in the example earlier
in this section. Thus a trust of "income to Tertius for life," paradoxically
perhaps, gives him a greater present interest than "income to Tertius
until he reaches 21 and then pay him the principal."'1 5 It also gives him
171. But it does not inevitably follow, as has been contended, that if a "Strekalovsky"
trust is not a transfer of a present interest then no outright gift to a young minor whose
parents are able to support and educate him can be a present interest. See Anderson,
supra note 166.
172. Kieckhefer v. Commissioner, 189 F. 2d 118, 122 (7th Cir. 1951). It seems to the
writer that "terms of the transfer" imposed by the donor were such that the case could
have gone the other way, affirming the opinion of the Tax Court below, without any
necessary implication that an outright gift to a minor would be a future Interest. Cf.
Arthur C. Stifel, Jr., 17 T.C.-No. 71 (Oct. 10, 1951).
173. Cf. Willis D. Wood, P-H 1951 TC DEc. 1 16.118 (1951).
174. Commissioner v. Disston, 325 U. S. 442 (1945); Fondren et al. v. Commissioner,
324 U. S. 18 (1945) ; United States v. Pelzer, 312 U. S. 399 (1941).
175. This result has been thoughtfully criticized in Charles v. Hassett, 43 F. Supp. 432,
435 (D. Mass. 1942), but has the merit of simplicity. See discussion in 2 PAUL, FEDEa
EsTATE AND G3FT TAXXrTIoN 638-40 (Supp. 1946). Shattuck, supra note 7, criticizes Sylvia
[Vol. 20
GIFTS TO MINORS
a greater present interest than "income to Tertius for life but in the
discretion of the trustee pay over the principal at any time." Here all
or a part of the income would cease should principal be distributed.
The uncertainty prevents computation of a value for the right to income
and eliminates any present interest whatever as effectively as if the
trustee had the right to accumulate the income in his discretion or had
been instructed to accumulate it.
The following chart may illuminate the discussion:
Income Provision
Tertius for life
Tertius to 21
Tertius to 21
Tertius for life
Accumulate for Tertius to 21
Pay to Tertius or accumulate
for him
Pay to Tertius or accumulate
for him
Pay to Tertius or accumulate
for him
Tertius as though he were a
ward
Prindpal
To B. on Tertius' death
To B. when Tertius is 21
To Tertius at 21
To Tertius at Trustees' dis-
cretion
To Tertius at 21
To Tertius at Trustees' dis-
cretion
To Tertius at 21
To Tertius on demand
To Tertius as though he were
a ward (in any event
at 21) or demand of
Guardian
Pre-ent Interest
Yes, "1%" depends on age170
Yes -but less
Identical with above
None177
None
None
None
100, or none1 78
100017o
Computation of Present and Future Interests in Trusts
No matter how young the beneficiary, there is a considerable difference
between the computed value of "income for life" and "income to 21."
The computation of the later is also more complicated. If Tertius is
one year old and is to receive income from the trust until be is 21 it is
not enough merely to take a twenty year term certain from table "B"
and from it directly compute the value of the right to the income for
that 20 year period because "income to 21" means "income to 21 or for
life, whichever is shorter." The computation from table "B" has first
to be made and then to be adjusted for the possibility the beneficiary
H. Evans, P-H 1951 TC Dcc. ff 17.24 (1951), on much the same grounds. In the Evans
case the exclusion was denied for gifts'to the adult donees as well as to the infants.
176. U. S. Treas. Reg. 108, § 86.19, Table A, column 2 (1943).
177. Sylvia H.'Evans, P-H 1951 TC DEc. U 17.24 (1951).
178. Depending on where donor lives. Kieckhefer v. Commissioner, 189 F.2d 11S
(7th Cir. 1951). Tax Court says "None" elsewhere. See Arthur C. Stifel, Jr., 17 T.C. 10,
No. 71 (Oct. 10, 1951). An appeal is expected in the Stifed case.
179. Strekalovsky v. Delaney, 78 F. Supp. 556 (D. Mass 194S); Cannon v. Robertson,
98 F. Supp. 331 (D. N. C. 1951).
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will not live to reach that age. For this purpose tables and formulae
not included in the Regulations have to be used.
To illustrate:
Life Income @ age 1-17.30771'80 X 4%o'l = 69%
Income to 21 @ age 1-11.33875182 X 4%183 = 45%
It is evident that a much larger "present interest" component will be
included in a gift of "income for life" than in one of "income to 21."
As the infant grows older or the age for terminating the fixed right to
income diminishes the difference widens rapidly. As a rule of thumb it
is easy to remember that during most of infancy a life income is valued
at about 75% of the corpus. 84 At age ten it is over 77%,'* while at age
ten "income to age 18" for example is worth only about 26% of the
corpus. 8 If the infant is twenty years, nine months, 1 8 the value of the
"income to 21" is only a tiny fraction of the corpus, but that three month
period is "not insubstantial,"' 88 and when the trustee had the right to
accumulate income during that three month period it has been held that
the donor could not claim any exclusion as the entire gift was of a
future interest 89 At age 21, an income for life, or the present interest,
is still worth over 73% of the total gift."'
When it seems important to conserve the lifetime exemption and to
utilize the maximum of annual exclusion, and at the same time circum-
stances commend both the use of trusts and a minimum of gifts over the
exclusion, the proportion and amount of the present interest and the
180. U. S. Treas. Reg. 108, § 86.19, Table A, column 2 (1943). Infant mortality reflected
in the tables causes the value for the life income or present interest to increase year by
year to age 7. At age 1 the value is greater than if the beneficiary is less than a year old
(see Table A), but still smaller than it will be at any subsequent age up to 29.
181. Assumed rate of return. U. S. Treas. Reg. 108, § 86.19 Tables A and B (1943).
182. Approximate. Factor derived from U. S. Treas. Reg. 108, § 86.19 (1943), Table
B for 20 years diminished for life expectancy in accordance with formula shown in Woa,
INHERITANCE TAX CALULATIONS 51 problem 4 (2d ed. 1937).
183. See note 181 supra.
184. U. S. Treas. Reg. 108, § 86.19 (1943), Table A column 2, multiplied by 4% (49o
is the assumed annual rate of return throughout these tables).
185. Ibid.
186. See note 182 supra. Eight years certain, adjusted for expectancy.
187. "It is not always flattering to our young men in college and in business .. . to
refer to them as infants, and yet this is exactly what the law considers them. . . ." Sternlleb
v. Normandie National Securities Corp., 263 N.Y. 245, 250, 188 N. E. 726, 728 (1934)
(per Crane, C. J.).
188. Hessenbruch v. Commissioner, 178 F. 2d 785 (3d Cir. 1950).
189. Ibid.
190. U. S. Treas. Reg. 108, § 86.19, Table A (1943).
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correct size of the total gift can be computed easily if the trust directs
income to a named beneficiary for life.' 9 '
Problem: To determine size of gift in trust to give $3,000 present
interest, i.e., value of income, to Tertius for life, he being seven
years old.192
Column 2 of table "A"'93 gives the present value of $1 per year for
life at the ages shown in column 1, or $19.62502 at age 7. The assumed
rate of return is 4%. (4% X 19.62502 = .7850008). Thus 78.5% of
the gift is present interest and the required answer is the number of
dollars which, multiplied by 78.5%, will equal $3,000, or $3,821.66. A
consent gift designed to use both Elder's own exclusion and his wife's
would be twice as large or $7,643.32. They will then have a combined
total of $1,643.32, or $821.66 each, of net gifts to report after deducting
the appropriate exclusion. This is the portion of the $30,000 lifetime
exemption of each used by the total gift of $7,643.31.
Should Elder wish to carry out a series of such gifts the following
table shows at a glance the results of starting at any selected age during
minority and making a gift to a trust of $4,000 each year until Tertius
reaches 21. Because the present interests for most ages during minority
are in the neighborhood of 75%, $4,000 was arbitrarily selected as a
gross gift on which about $3,000 of exclusion would be available. The
fourth and fifth columns are cumulative, showing for example that starting
when Tertius is one year old (second line, first column), if Elder gives
$4,000 to such a trust each year until his grandson is twenty he will
have given $80,000 (fourth column), all but $20,327.68 of which (fifth
column) will have been within the annual exclusion, so that he will still
retain unused nearly $9,700 ($30,000-$20,327.68, sixth column) of his
exemption. With the "consent" of his spouse the gifts can be doubled;
the table would then show the results for each spouse.
The proportions of present interests running up to 78% are large
because they provide "income for life." Income for a shorter period, as
has been shown, may reduce that proportion sharply. A trust providing
for accumulation or giving the trustee discretion as to payments of prin-
cipal or income will eliminate the present interest entirely? 4 This
191. Or, but less easily, to any given age. See note 182 supra.
192. Table A shows that at seven years the present interest will be fractionally larger
per dollar of gift than at any other age. The adverse effect of infant mortality is thereafter
no longer apparent in the Table.
193. U. S. Treas. Reg. 108, § 86.19 (1943).
194. See chart, p. 265, supra.
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$4,000 ANNUAL GIFTS TO IRREVOCABLE LIFETIME TRUST FOR MINOR
Life or Total
Age of Present Future Total Gifts "Net Gifts"
Minor Interest Interest to Age 21 to Age 21
Less than
1 year $2,356.53 $1,643.47 $84,000 $21,971.15
1 year 2,769.23 1,230.77 80,000 20,327.68
2 years 2,991.32 1,008.68 76,000 19,096.91
3 years 3,065.44 934.56 72,000 18,088.23
4 years 3,105.96 894.04 68,000 17,088.23
5 years 3,128.48 871.52 64,000 16,088.23
6 years 3,138.77 861.23 60,000 15,088.23
7 years 3,140.00 860.00 56,000 14,088.23
8 years 3,137.76 862.24 52,000 13,088.23
9 years 3,125.46 874.54 48,000 12,088.23
10 years 3,112.57 887.43 44,000 11,088.23
11 years 3,099.11 900.89 40,000 10,088.23
12 years 3,085.09 914.91 36,000 9,088.23
13 years 3,070.50 929.50 32,000 8,088.23
14 years 3,055.34 944.66 28,000 7,088.23
15 years 3,039.62 960.38 24,000 6,088.23
16 years 3,023.31 976.69 20,000 5,088.23
17 years 3,006.42 993.58 16,000 4,088.23
18 years 2,988.91 1,011.09 12,000 3,088.23
19 years 2,970.80 1,029.20 8,000 2,077.14
20 years 2,952.06 1,047.94 4,000 1,047.94
simply means that the donor will use up his lifetime exemption more
rapidly. Many-if not most-prospective donors can well afford to do so.
An Accumulation Trust
If the trustee is directed to accumulate the income for later distri-
bution to the beneficiary, or if he is given discretion to do so, the ex-
clusion is lost. This may influence the grantor's plans materially. If he
can adapt use of the exclusions to his purposes he may wish to spread
his proposed gift over a number of years. If he finds a somewhat larger
trust more to his liking he can perhaps better plan to take advantage of
prospective income tax savings, make his entire gift at once, and forego
multiple exclusions.
Suppose he and his wife believe they can afford to give $20,000 to
each of three grandchildren. Assuming three separate trusts, each of
$20,000, and each for a single beneficiary, the trustee can be given power
to accumulate, or to pay or to apply, the income 1 5 He can be given
similar power to disburse principal.19 With no exclusions these gifts
195. Cf. U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.22 (a)-21 (1947), as amended by T.D. 5567, 1947-2
Cum. BuLL. 9 (Clifford regulations).
196. Ibid.
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will immediately use up the $60,000 lifetime exemption of the donor and
his spouse. If at this stage, however, it seems desirable to utilize some
of the benefits of the exclusions it can easily be done. Part of the income
can be fixed on the grandchildren, and if the gift is large enough, as it
would be on these facts, some part of the principal can be retained in
the trust for enough years to get a full exclusion. For example: income
from $20,000 at the 4% table rate is $800. Table "B" shows that each
dollar of annual income for thirty years is worth $17.292030 T Adjusting
this factor downward for Tertius' life expectancy at one year, each dollar
of annual income (@ 4%) is found to be worth in the neighborhood of
$14 in terms of present interest and of exclusion.0 s Thus a provision
in the agreement that one-half of the corpus shall constitute a separate
trust to be held until Tertius reaches 31, granting him the immediate
and absolute right to the income on that half gives about $5,600 exclu-
sion for the year in which the trust is created."' Pro forma it works
out like this:
Total Gift in Trust for a One-Year-Old Infant
or $10,000 "Pay-Out" share:
Annual Income @ 4%o $400
Approximate Present Value of
$1 Annual Income from Age
1 to Age 31 X 14
Approximate Value of Present
Interest (available against
annual exclusions) $
Balance (representing future
interest)
$10,000 "Accumulation" Share
(representing entirely future
interest)
Total Present Interest
Future interest in pay-out
portion
Future interest in accumulation
Total Future Interest
$4,400
10,000
$20,000
5,600
4,400 $10,000
10,000 $20,000
$5,600
14,400 $20,000
197. U. S. Treas. Reg. 108, § 86.19, Table B, column 2 (1943).
198. See note 182 supra.
199. Of course this amount will differ for each of the three grandchildren unless both
the duration of the trusts and the ages of the infant beneficiaries are identical. One, thre
or six indentures may be used to create two trusts for each of three grandchildren provided,
if combined, the language is sufficiently dear. The larger fund tends to simplify investing.
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If the "pay-out" share is increased from $10,000 to $11,000 the
present interest will be increased to about $6,100 or slightly more than the
allowable $6,000 exclusions. Similar results will follow postponing termi-
nation of the pay-out trust to age 36,200 while leaving the amount un-
changed, or by reducing the age while increasing still further the size
of the "pay-out" portion.
Within the accumulation portion the trustee can be authorized to use
income or accumulations to pay college expenses, or to invade the corpus
even to the point of exhaustion without altering by this added flexibility
the gift tax consequences. If Elder has four grandchildren and can
afford to give each $20,000 (or an aggregate of $80,000), he can in this
way still hold his net consent gifts below $60,000 (i.e., 4 X $14,400),
the other $22,400 (4 X $5,600) of the $80,000 total being covered by
four exclusions for himself and his consenting spouse.
Income Tax-Tertius as a Dependent for Income Tax Purposes
An accumulation trust or a combination of accumulation and pay-out
may be found especially desirable and possibly preferable to either a
pay-out trust or to outright gifts of property producing taxable income,
when it seems desirable to keep Tertius as an income tax dependent of
his parents. This can be done only as long as Tertius' gross income is
less than $600.201 A program such as outlined in the foregoing twenty-
one year table would soon give him more than $600 if the trust produces
a normal amount of taxable income.
A further advantage that applies equally to an accumulation or pay-
out trust, in comparison with outright gifts in any form, is the taxation
of capital gains separately to the trust instead of to the infant himself.
Gains taken in the infant's own account, as opposed to those taken in a
trust for his benefit, may make him ineligible as a dependent in his
parents' return even in years in which he would otherwise qualify.
One of the few disadvantages of the common trust fund as an invest-
ment vehicle for such trusts where the income is currently distributable
would appear to be the impracticability of managing the investments of
the trust with a sensitive eye to the family tax picture as it develops
from year to year. While simplicity and ease of administration are high
on the list of objectives for the trust, attention to the tax-saving aspects
of investment policy can be profitable even in a small trust. Among pos-
200. Table B shows figures only to 30 years, but if the income from one-half the
trust is fixed on a one year old infant to age 36, the computed value of the income will
closely approximate $6,000. See tables in WoLF, op. cit. supra note 182.
201. INT. REV. CODE § 25(b)(1)(D). The Revenue Act of 1951 raised this figure from
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sibly useful investment media to adjust this feature of tax liability may
be mentioned tax-free municipal bonds, Series "F" Savings Bonds on
which income may be accrued for twelve years, and an occasional common
stock, dividends on which are likely to be free of current income tax.
Series "E" Savings Bonds are not available to trustees. -2
This kind of tax saving can be given attention in drafting the trust.
For example, the trustee may be instructed to pay out only some specified
amount or fraction of the income under $600 per year, or some smaller
amount designed to provide leeway for the beneficiary's possible income
from other sources. Such a limitation may affect the proportion of the
gift which can be considered a present interest, but not necessarily ad-
versely to the donor taxpayer. The combination of pay-out and accumu-
lation has the merit of dividing the ordinary income produced by the
trust between two taxpayers, the beneficiary and the trust itself. This is
usually an advantage, and if the income is large can result in important
savings.
Summary of Gifts in Trust
Many donors have been deterred from making small gifts in trust
because normally gift tax returns are required and portions of the life-
time exemptions are consumed. The high cost of administration and the
related problems of adequate diversification of the small trust have been
additional deterrents.
Investment company shares and discretionary common trust funds
now supply a ready-made answer to the more serious cost and adminis-
trative problems, and can supply a complete answer to the problem of
diversifying a small trust fund.0 3 For the great majority of donors the
use of portions of lifetime exemptions from the gift tax should prove
no hardship as otherwise the exemption may never be used. Attention
to income tax saving in the small trust may be rewarding, and here the
trust offers great flexibility compared with outright gifts. The trust also
meets the problems of management of the infant's property without the
trouble and expense of legal guardianship. Problems of the Clifford and
the Stuart cases, and the estate tax can usually be overcome. The small
trust as a vehicle for gifts to minors deserves much wider use than it
has had. It offers a fertile field for trust promotion and for the expansion
of trust company activities, particularly into largely unexploited areas,
through their common trust funds and wider use of investment company
shares as trust investments.
202. 31 Cona FaD. REGS. § 315.4 (1949). The 1951 provisions for extending the maturity
of Series "E" Bonds give added tax flexibility.
203. See Putney, Mutual Funds Make Small Trusts Possible, 89 TRuS XD EsLT.s
836 (1950).
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If trust companies care to obtain their share of this attractive business,
those which have schedules of high minimum fees in the $5-50,000 area
should re-examine them in relation to simple accumulation trusts that are
to be invested and reinvested in their own discretionary common trust
funds or in investment company shares. Properly drafted,04 these trusts
can be administered with maximum advantage to the beneficiaries, mini-
mum cost to the trust company, and with a minimum of risk. If they are
to terminate at age twenty-one or with distributions for education begin-
ning about age eighteen, they will presumably result in an average col-
lection of principal commissions considerably sooner than the average
of all trusts. The field would seem especially attractive to hundreds of
smaller banks and trust companies. Lacking common trust funds of their
own, they can use shares of investment companies to reduce the cost of
administration and to eliminate problems of diversification.200
204. For suggested clauses authorizing this method of investment, see Rogers, Capital
Gain Dividends--A Suggestion for Draftsmen, 20 Fora. L. Rav. 79 (1951); 90 TRUSTS
AND ESTATES 300 (1951). A sentence authorizing the trustee to rely on the investment com-
pany's characterization of any distribution might well be added to the clauses suggested
in those papers. See Anderson, Principal or Income?, 90 TRUSTS AND ESTATES 530 (1951).
If the donor expects to benefit from the consent of his spouse to a gift in trust, there Is
a possible drafting booby-trap in a provision such as the following: "To trustee, income
to Tertius in discretion of trustee with any accumulated income during Tertlus' life to
be added to corpus (or any other provision that introduces an element of uncertainty or
discretion as to who takes what and when) remainder to the spouse of the donor if then
living and if not then living etc." Splitting such a gift by consent may not be available
because the regulations provide that "If one spouse transferred property in part to his
spouse and in part to third parties, the consent is effective with respect to the interest
transferred to third parties only insofar as such interest is ascertainable at the time of the
gift, and hence severable from the interest transferred to his spouse." U.S. Treas. Reg. 108,
§ 86.3a (a) (4) (1943); T.D. 5698 4, 1949-1 Cum. BULL. 228. If, however, the gift is
simply to trustee, income to Tertius for life without discretion as to any other payment
and if accumulations, if any, and income on accumulations are also directed to third parties,
the interests transferred to third parties would appear to be ascertainable at the time of
the gift and a consent as to the gift of income for the life of Tertius would be permitted.
205. On January 3, 1952 the Commissioner of Internal Revenue proposed the use of
revised 3Y2% tables A and B for use as to gifts made after December 31, 1951. If adopted
they will of course, affect the particular calculations in this section on Trusts. No changes
appear to be proposed in the methods of computation. The new tables increase the valu-
ation of life estates at early ages. The "75%" rule of thumb suggested on page 266, for
example, might be changed to "80% or more." In note 192 supra, the words "seven years"
should be changed to "one year" in order to bring it into conformity with the new tables.
The text of note 180 supra, might be omitted.
